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Cognitive Radio Network (CRN) is an emerging paradigm that makes use of Dynamic 
Spectrum Access (DSA) to communicate opportunistically, in the un-licensed Industrial, 
Scientific and Medical bands or frequency bands otherwise licensed to incumbent users such as 
TV broadcast. Interest in the development of CRNs is because of severe under-utilization of 
spectrum bands by the incumbent Primary Users (PUs) that have the license to use them coupled 
with an ever-increasing demand for unlicensed spectrum for a variety of new mobile and 
wireless applications. The essence of Cognitive Radio (CR) operation is the cooperative and 
opportunistic utilization of licensed spectrum bands by the Secondary Users (SUs) that 
collectively form the CRN without causing any interference to PUs’ communications.  
CRN operation is characterized by factors such as network-wide quiet periods for 
cooperative spectrum sensing, opportunistic/dynamic spectrum access and non-deterministic 
operation of PUs. These factors can have a devastating impact on the overall throughput and can 
significantly increase the control overheads. Therefore, to support the same level of QoS as 
traditional wireless access technologies, very closer interaction is required between layers of the 
protocol stack.  
Opportunistic spectrum utilization without causing interference to the PUs is only possible if 
the SUs periodically sense the spectrum for the presence of PUs’ signal. To minimize the effects 
of hardware capabilities, terrain features and PUs’ transmission ranges, DSA is undertaken in a 
collaborative manner where SUs periodically carry out spectrum sensing in their respective 
geographical locations. Collaborative spectrum sensing has numerous security loopholes and can 
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be favorable to malicious nodes in the network that may exploit vulnerabilities associated with 
DSA such as launching a spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack. Some CRN 
standards such as the IEEE 802.22 wireless regional area network employ a two-stage quiet 
period mechanism based on a mandatory Fast Sensing and an optional Fine Sensing stage for 
DSA. This arrangement is meant to strike a balance between the conflicting goals of proper 
protection of incumbent PUs’ signals and optimum QoS for SUs so that only as much time is 
spent for spectrum sensing as needed. Malicious nodes in the CRN however, can take advantage 
of the two-stage spectrum sensing mechanism to launch smart denial of service (DoS) jamming 
attacks on CRNs during the fast sensing stage. 
Coexistence protocols enable collocated CRNs to contend for and share the available 
spectrum. However, most coexistence protocols do not take into consideration the fact that 
channels of the available spectrum can be heterogeneous in the sense that they can vary in their 
characteristics and quality such as SNR or bandwidth. Without any mechanism to enforce 
fairness in accessing varying quality channels, ensuring coexistence with minimal contention and 
efficient spectrum utilization for CRNs is likely to become a very difficult task. 
The cooperative and opportunistic nature of communication has many challenges associated 
with CRNs’ operation. In view of the challenges described above, this dissertation presents 
solutions including cross-layer approaches, reputation system, optimization and game theoretic 
approaches to handle (1) degradation in TCP’s throughput resulting from packet losses and 
disruptions in spectrum availability due non-deterministic use of spectrum by the PUs (2) 
presence of malicious SUs in the CRN that may launch various attacks on CRNs’ including 
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SSDF and jamming and (3) sharing of heterogeneous spectrum resources among collocated 
CRNs without a centralized mechanism to enforce cooperation among otherwise non-cooperative 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview: Cognitive Radio Networks 
 Studies on spectrum utilization have shown that static allocation of the spectrum has resulted 
in severe under-utilization of this scarce resource, even as low as 14% [1]. With the proliferation 
of devices that rely on wireless access to the internet, the demand for wireless spectrum bands is 
ever-increasing. This wide gap in the demand and supply of wireless spectrum resource forced 
regulatory bodies such as the FCC to allow un-licensed access to spectrum bands, also referred to 
as the TV white spaces, otherwise licensed to the Primary Users (PUs) in an opportunistic and 
non-interfering basis [2]. This has given rise to a challenging as well as an exciting type of 
networks  consisting of devices called the Cognitive Radio (CR) which is defined by FCC [3] as 
“A radio that can change its transmitter parameters based on interaction with the environment in 
which it operates”. A cognitive radio network (CRN) comprises devices that are capable of 
sensing their radio environment and adjusting operational parameters to communicate in an 
efficient manner while avoiding any interference with the PUs. The idea of Cognitive Radio 
(CR) was first presented in [4] which envisioned a CR as a fully cognitive device capable of 
observing and adjusting to all possible radio parameters. 
CRNs operate in the licensed as well as un-Licensed spectrum bands, by opportunistically 
utilizing bands that are not used by the incumbent user at a given time. CR paradigm is gaining 
widespread recognition as a solution to the problem of spectrum scarcity however the 
opportunistic manner of communication in CRNs has opened up numerous challenges to the 
research community resulting in research initiatives such as the DoD’s Joint Tactical Radio 
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System, DARPA’s Next Generation (XG) program, IEEE 802.11af [5] also known as White-Fi 
or super Wi-Fi and IEEE 802.22 Wireless Regional Area network (WRAN) [6]. Research in this 
area is aimed towards both civilian applications, such as provisioning broadband Internet access 
in rural areas using TV white spaces under the IEEE 802.22 WRAN working group, as well as 
military applications such as DARPA’s XG communications program. 
 
Figure 1.1: Typical Cognitive Radio Cycle 
 
In order to detect and use a vacant spectrum band, a CRN relies on cooperative sensing 
feedback from CR devices that periodically sense the spectrum for the presence of PUs’ signals 
and report the spectrum’s occupancy status to a fusion center (FC). A typical CR cycle [7] is 
shown in figure 1.1 wherein devices that form part of a CRN, also called the secondary users 
(SUs), cooperatively perform spectrum sensing, exchange their sensed data which is then 
aggregated at the FC which then decides whether to continue communicating using the current 
channels or to switch to some other channels and/or communication parameters. This method of 









(DSA) and is shown in figure 1.2 which shows how a CRN would make use of spectrum 
opportunities i.e., switch to channels that may become available with the passage of time. In 
addition to switching channels based on PU activity, DSA also includes varying communication 
parameters according to user needs as well as other radio environments. 
 
Figure 1.2: Dynamic Spectrum Access by Cognitive Radio Networks 
 
CRNs may be operated as infrastructured or ad hoc networks. Intuitively, the infrastructured 
CRN has a base station (BS) that controls every aspect of the network including aggregation of 
spectrum sensing reports from its SUs and the decision of selecting vacant channels for 
communication. On the other hand, since there is no central entity to control network operations 
in an ad hoc CRN, the task of spectrum sensing reports’ aggregation and channel selection 




Figure 1.3: Infrastructured and Ad hoc CRN architecture 
 
IEEE 802.22 WRAN [6] is a technology which is being developed as an infrastructured CRN 
and is expected to see deployment especially in the rural areas or areas lacking communications 
infrastructure. It is designed to operate in TV bands from 54-862 MHz with a total of 47 
channels. These frequency bands allow long range communication typically from 17 – 30 km 
with a maximum range of 100 km. The network is organized in a Point-to-Multipoint 
configuration called a Cell, has a fixed Base Station (BS) and up to 512 simultaneously 
associated SUs per Cell. 
IEEE 802.11af [5] is a standard developed for opportunistic communication utilizing the 
TVWS portion of the spectrum that can be used in ad hoc configuration. It is designed to operate 
in TV bands from 54 – 790 MHz giving a total of 39 channels with the option of channel 
bonding/aggregation of up to 4 channels. The standard has a maximum transmission range of 5 




Opportunistic spectrum access is the fundamental property of a CRN. The defining 
characteristics of opportunistic spectrum access are non-deterministic nature of PUs’ spectrum 
usage and the network wide quiet periods that are used to determine whether or not PU(s) signals 
are present on the spectrum. These characteristics give rise to numerous challenges that form the 
motivation for this dissertation and are highlighted subsequently. 
Majority of the research efforts in DSA have been directed towards the Physical (PHY) and 
Medium Access (MAC) layers of the protocol stack while the upper layers, especially the 
transport layer, have not received that much attention. Unlike traditional radio technologies and 
protocols, much closer interaction among transport layer and the MAC/PHY layers is required in 
cognitive radio network, mainly because of network-wide quiet periods, opportunistic / dynamic 
spectrum access, and non-deterministic operation of PUs. These factors can increase 
retransmission overheads significantly and have a devastating impact on the overall throughput 
QoS.  
Opportunistic spectrum utilization without causing interference to the PUs is only possible if 
the SUs periodically ‘sense’ the spectrum for the presence of PUs’ signal. To minimize the 
effects of errors in spectrum sensing, DSA is undertaken in a collaborative manner, where SUs 
periodically carry out spectrum sensing in their respective geographical locations and report their 
measurements to the FC which then decides whether to continue using a specific spectrum band 
or to vacate it. However, DSA can also be favorable to malicious nodes in the network that may 
provide false spectrum sensing reports or jam spectrum opportunities for the CRN. Such attacks 
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may adversely affect spectrum sensing decisions causing harmful interference to the PUs or deny 
the use of the vacant spectrum bands to the CRN. Measures to guard against such attacks are 
vital for the success of CRNs. 
There may be many CRNs collocated in a given region all of whom compete for access to the 
available channels, a situation called self co-existence in the context of CRNs. Most coexistence 
protocols do not take into consideration the fact that these channels can be heterogeneous in the 
sense that they can vary in their characteristics and quality. Without any mechanism that can 
enforce fairness in accessing varying quality channels with optimum utilization of spectrum 
opportunities, coexistence for CRNs is likely to become a very difficult task.  
1.3 Proposed Work and Contributions 
The proposed work is to overcome challenges associated with the opportunistic spectrum 
access by the CRNs. The contributions of this dissertation are summarized below. 
 Design of two cross-layer schemes to boost TCP’s throughput that is degraded because of 
additional delays in packet delivery as well as packet losses due to network wide quiet 
periods for spectrum sensing and non-deterministic nature of PUs’ communications. 
 Design of a framework for integrating a reputation system with a spatio-spectral 
anomaly/outlier detection system to defend against spectrum sensing data falsification 
(SSDF) attacks. 
 Design of an adaptive defense framework which enables the CRN to thwart smart 
jamming attacks and improve spectrum utilization under noise.  
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 Formulation of an evolutionary game theoretic framework through which contending 
collocated CRNs evolve their strategies to select a channel from a set of disparate 
channels and converge to an evolutionarily stable state. 
 Formulation of an anti-coordination game with a set of disparate channels for collocated 
CRNs to approach Correlated Equilibrium which is both fair as well as optimum in both 
the centralized as well as decentralized settings. 
1.4 Organization of Dissertation 
Remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents transparent cross-
layer solutions for throughput boost in CRNs. Chapter 3 gives the design of a framework that 
integrates a reputation system with an outlier detection scheme to defend against SSDF attacks. 
Chapter 4 discusses the design of the proposed adaptive spectrum sensing framework that guards 
against smart jamming attacks and improves spectrum opportunity utilization under noisy 
channel conditions. Chapter 5 presents an evolutionary game theoretic framework for long-term 
coexistence in CRNs when the channels available for unlicensed access are of varying quality. 
Chapter 6 presents an anti-coordination game for collocated CRNs to approach Correlated 
Equilibrium which is both fair as well as optimum with regards to disparate channels. Chapter 7 
gives the conclusion. 
1.5 References 
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CHAPTER 2: TRANSPARENT CROSS-LAYER SOLUTIONS FOR TCP 
 THROUGHPUT BOOST 
Unlike traditional wireless communication technologies and protocols, much closer 
interaction among transport layer and the MAC/PHY layers is required in CRNs because of its 
communication characteristics such as network-wide quiet periods, opportunistic / dynamic 
spectrum access, and non-deterministic nature of PUs’ communication patterns. These factors 
can have a devastating impact on the networks’ throughput and can cause significant 
retransmission overheads. TCP being the predominant transport protocol of the Internet needs to 
be capable of handling additional constraints imposed by peculiar communication characteristics 
of CRNs. 
There has been a lot of research to tackle the problems associated with TCP’s handling of 
DSA [1, 2, 4 – 7] when dealing with communications between devices in the CRN and the 
Internet. However transparency, a key property for any solution to be economical and scalable, 
has largely been ignored in the aforementioned context. Existing solutions require either the 
presence of special purpose devices in the CRN or modification in TCP implementations of 
devices taking part in communications across CRNs and the internet. Our solutions to 
transparently boost TCP’s throughput is specifically designed for infrastructured CRNs such as 
the IEEE 802.22 WRAN and take advantage of the presence of a BS through which all traffic to 
and from the Internet has to pass. 
The main contribution of our proposed solutions is that they provide throughput boost 
transparently i.e. without any need for special purpose devices in the network or requiring any 
10 
 
changes in the end systems making them ideal for initial deployment of a WRAN. The two 
solutions presented are proposed to be implemented only at the CRN BS and provide alternatives 
in situations where end to end semantics of TCP connections may or may not be important for 
communication across the CRN and the Internet. 
This chapter is organized as follows: In section 2.1 an overview of the works related to our 
proposed TCP throughput boost is presented. Section 2.2 gives the detailed design of our 
proposed solutions. Section 2.3 presents performance evaluation of the proposed solutions 
through simulations and section 2.4 gives a discussion on the solutions’ design and performance. 
Section 2.5 concludes this chapter. 
2.1 Related Work 
TP-CRAHN [1] is a protocol designed for use within ad hoc CRNs. It incorporates a cross-
layer design with explicit feedback from every node between the source and destination nodes, 
regarding their sensing schedules and the length of quiet periods intended for detecting PUs 
through spectrum sensing. Its transport protocol interacts with physical layer’s channel 
information, link layer’s buffer management as well as a mobility prediction framework to cater 
for varying parameters and network dynamics. This protocol however does not cater for the 
situations when either source or the destination of a TCP connection is outside the CRN and the 
impact DSA in the CRN will have on TCP’s timeout intervals and congestion control mechanism 
for such connections. This is especially the case when the sender is at the Internet side of the 
connection and is unaware of additional delays caused due to CRN’s DSA. 
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TCPE [2] protocol is designed for heterogeneous networks involving CRNs and the wired 
Internet. It aims to achieve better throughput through available bandwidth estimation and round-
trip-time (RTT) difference between successive TCP segments. It assumes packet delays to have 
been caused by spectrum sensing if the difference between successive RTTs is more than 90% of 
spectrum sensing duration (SSD). The study does not consider the situation when the source is in 
the Internet and destination node is located in a CRN, in which case the source node in the 
Internet would have to know the SSD for destination node’s network, which can vary by 
technology [3]. 
An approach based on local loss recovery has been employed in [4] which is somewhat 
similar to our proposed solutions however this scheme is designed for Cellular networks to 
mitigate the effects of losses due to high bit-errors and handoffs. It requires the use of either 
Explicit Congestion Notifications (ECN) or Negative Acknowledgements (NACK). Due to non-
deterministic nature of PUs’ spectrum usage, ECN and NACK can be expected to cause 
significant throttling of TCP’s traffic as well as increased control overhead. Our proposed 
solutions on the other hand are designed to cater for packet losses and delays that occur due to 
DSA in a transparent manner in addition to the typical delays and losses of a wireless network. 
To alleviate TCP poor performance in wireless networks, I-TCP [5] has been proposed to 
split a TCP connection at the BS into two separate connections. It however requires special 
devices called Mobility Support Routers in the wireless network and also requires modification 
to the TCP code in mobile hosts thus making it unsuitable for a scalable deployment. It also does 
not take into account the need for maintaining TCP semantics violated due to split connections. 
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In [6], another split TCP connection approach is proposed for ad hoc cognitive networks to 
mitigate the effects of TCP un-fairness towards nodes that are relatively farther away from the 
source node. It works by forming a chain of suitably selected nodes to act as TCP proxies 
between the source and destination of a TCP connection, both of which must lie within the ad 
hoc network. 
A Semi-Split TCP has been proposed in [7], in which a CRN’s BS buffers the ACKs 
received from the receiver in cognitive network and controls the amount of ACKs relayed back 
to the sender in order to throttle the sender and to prevent the BS’s buffers from starvation. The 
proposed semi-split TCP solution is basically meant to achieve a slower yet smooth flow of 
packets from a source in the Internet and a destination in the CRN. 
Our research differs from the work presented above in many ways. The most important 
difference in our work is that the proposed solutions are transparent to both the source as well as 
the destination machines of a TCP connection. Our proposed solutions can be implemented only 
at the CRN BS in order to achieve the boost in TCP’s throughput. These solutions also do not 
require any additional special purpose devices to be placed in a CRN in order to mitigate the 
effects of DSA on TCP’s performance. Our proposed solutions are intended for TCP flows that 
span across the CRN and the Internet as opposed to some of the above solutions that cater for 
TCP flows only inside the CRN. Since TCP flow semantics are lost due to splitting up of TCP 
connections, our proposed solutions provide two alternatives for situations when TCP flow 




In this section, we discuss how TCP congestion control algorithm and hence network’s 
throughput may suffer in the context of IEEE 802.22 WRAN based CRN. The features of a CRN 
that could impact TCP performance are: (i) quiet period duration i.e., time that is used for 
spectrum sensing (ii) the amount of PU activity in the region of a CRN and (iii) CRN’s accuracy 
in detecting PU’s presence on the spectrum. We use the terms CRN and WRAN interchangeably 
unless there is a specific need to distinguish between the two. In the subsequent subsections, we 
present the motivation behind this work by describing the impact of the aforementioned CRN 
features on TCP’s performance. 
2.2.1 Quiet Period for Spectrum Sensing 
In order to protect the incumbent PUs from harmful interference, a CRN has to enforce quiet 
periods in the network to effectively sense the spectrum for its availability. The length of these 
quiet periods and spectrum sensing can vary depending on the algorithm used [3] that may have 
significant impact on QoS. Users in a CRN would expect the same level of QoS (e.g. max delay 
of 20 msec in case of voice traffic) as in any other network.  
To strike a balance in the conflicting goals of protecting PUs’ communication and achieving 
a desired level of QoS, IEEE 802.22 WRAN standard employs a two-stage quiet period 
management scheme, where the stages are fast sensing (~ 9 – 20 µsec) and fine sensing (~ 0.3 – 
160 msec) [8]. The network is synchronized and every time slot (160 msec) is called a Channel 
Detection Time (CDT). Every CDT can have one or more fast sensing periods and at most one 
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fine sensing period. However, the BS decides to carry out fine sensing and determines the 
required duration based on the outcome of fast sensing periods. The fine sensing period may 
occupy a whole time slot. The two stage quiet period mechanism for spectrum sensing in IEEE 
802.22 WRANs is shown in figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1: Two Stage Spectrum Sensing in IEEE 802.22 WRAN 
 
TCP uses RTT measurements for estimating available bandwidth and calculating a suitable 
Retransmission Timeout (RTO) interval for a particular connection, which is further used in its 
congestion control algorithm [9]. As per standard TCP Timer management [10], RTO values 
should be at least 1 sec and implementations must never be more aggressive by selecting smaller 
values. However, if smaller values of RTO are used e.g. 500 msec in [11] or 200 msec as in [12] 
as well as Linux, the RTO values will become comparable to WRAN’s fine sensing times. In that 
case, whenever a packet is delayed in WRAN because of fine sensing duration, the source TCP 
will have a good chance to have premature timeout, erroneously attributing it to congestion and 
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will resort to un-necessary retransmissions, resulting in increased overheads and decreased 
throughput.  
Figure 2.2: Impact of Quiet Periods on TCP's Throughput 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the significant impact of CRN’s fine sensing on the performance of TCP 
communication. For the purpose of this work, we call the probability for BS to decide to conduct 
fine sensing in a CDT slot as Fine sensing Probability. The results shown in Figure 2.2 show the 
file transfer completion time (Y-axis) for a file size of 4 MB, in an FTP application at three 
different fine sensing probabilities and for fine sensing durations kept from 0 to 20% of TCP 
RTO interval (X-axis).  
As concluded in [12], spectrum sensing quiet periods are most debilitating for TCP 
performance in a DSA network. We believe that a transparent mechanism is therefore needed to 
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monitor the interaction of TCP RTO interval and spectrum sensing quiet periods in the WRAN 
and take appropriate measures for DSA not to affect TCP congestion control. This would result 
in boosting TCP throughput while minimizing retransmission overheads and if possible, 
maintaining the end-to-end semantics of TCP connections. 
Figure 2.3: Impact of PU Activity and Packet Loss Rate on TCP's Throughput 
 
2.2.2 Primary Users’ Activity 
The two-stage quiet period and spectrum sensing mechanism of IEEE 802.22 WRAN as 
shown in figure 2.1 is intended to strike a balance in ensuring that the PUs are protected from 
harmful interference from the un-licensed use of spectrum and its efficient utilization in the 
absence of PUs. During every CDT every SU in the WRAN carries out fast sensing across a 
specified number of channels and reports its measurements to the BS. Based on these 
measurements, the BS may decide not to resort to fine sensing if it concludes that PU’s presence 














































on a specific channel is not detected, or it may ask the SUs to go into fine sensing period, if it 
suspects presence of a PU and needs further confirmation.  
Clearly, the two stage sensing mechanism is intended to carry out fine sensing of the 
spectrum in each CDT slot only if it is necessary as it would result in the waste of a large chunk 
of spectrum resource if the PU was not utilizing the spectrum. Figure 2.3 shows the performance 
of TCP under various fine sensing probabilities and packet loss rates. It is worth noting that fine 
sensing probability is directly proportional to the amount of PUs’ activity on the spectrum. 
Similarly, as the duration of fine sensing increases with respect to TCP’s RTO interval, it has 
greater impact on TCP’s throughput as can be seen in figure 2.4. For these reasons, a mechanism 
is needed that would monitor the level of PU activity in the WRAN and not let it affect TCP 
congestion control mechanism.  
Figure 2.4: Impact of Fine Sensing Duration on TCP's Throughput 
 






































sensing duration 5% of RTO
sensing duration 10% of RTO
sensing duration 15% of RTO
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2.2.3 Primary User Detection Accuracy 
Another factor that will have adverse effects on TCP performance in a CRN is the accuracy 
of PU detection scheme(s). On one hand, false alarms in detection of PU’s signal will result in 
wasted spectrum opportunities. On the other hand, if a PU is transmitting in a spectrum band and 
the CRN is unable to detect its activity, then it will result in harmful interference to the PU as 
well as packet losses for the CRN. If the probability of not detecting PU’s presence is high then 
there will be significant amount of packet losses in the CRN due to this false spectrum sensing.  
In a recent study, probability of PU detection in an IEEE 802.22 WRAN was found out to be 
0.9 while the probability of a false alarm as 0.1 for all signal types [13]. Increase in packet loss 
probability will further deteriorate the already error prone nature of wireless communications. 
Therefore, a CRN must have a robust mechanism to recover from packet losses due to spectrum 
sensing errors. 
2.3 Proposed Solutions 
In this section, we present the details of our proposed solutions for throughput boost in an 
IEEE 802.22 WRAN. These solutions are transparent because all the proposed enhancements 
are implemented at the WRAN BS and no changes are required at source or the destination of a 
TCP connection. The reasons for this choice are: (i) On one hand, BS is the controller of all 
WRAN operations and therefore responsible for scheduling spectrum sensing and usage by SUs 
while on the other hand, it also is the gateway to Internet, as shown in figure 1.3. It therefore has 
the capability to transparently improve TCP throughput. (ii) Implementing enhancements at the 
19 
 
BS only and not at the sender or receiver, resolves the issue of scalability in the context of 
Internet, and facilitates smooth transition in upgrading BS incrementally. The two solutions are: 
local loss recovery at the BS and split TCP connection both of which are explained subsequently. 
2.3.1 Local Loss Recovery at Base Station 
The first of our proposed solutions to mitigate the effects of increased packet losses and 
delays due to DSA is local loss recovery by the WRAN BS. Specifically, the BS continuously 
monitors all TCP traffic to and from the host(s) in the Internet. It does so by implementing a 
Loss Recovery Module (LRM). The LRM records information regarding all TCP traffic 
traversing through it in both directions and their associated TCP state which includes sequence 
numbers and advertised window sizes as well as timers.  
The LRM restricts the number of un-acknowledged packets sent to the SU to a parameter 
ADV_WIN which represents the current size of the receiver’s advertised window. It however 
does not implement TCP congestion control mechanism because it has little significance within 
the context of the one-hop WRAN. For the lifetime of TCP connections, the BS maintains 
separate duplicate buffers used to maintain copies of all un-acknowledged packets of a particular 
TCP connection. Packet loss is detected if an acknowledgement (ACK) is not received before 
expiration of the local timer or 3 duplicate ACKs of a TCP packet are received. Duplicate copy 
of a lost packet is retransmitted for local recovery of the loss and this is repeated for a maximum 
of MAX_RETRY times.  
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Algorithm for the algorithm implemented in LRM is shown in table 2.1.While any packet 
loss is recovered locally, any duplicate ACKs from the receiver are dropped at the BS. Values for 
the retransmission timers at the BS are kept at values selected to ensure that these are large 
enough so that un-necessary retransmissions are avoided if the ACKs are delayed due to 
spectrum sensing, but small enough to ensure that packet losses within the WRAN are recovered 
locally and the sender’s RTO interval does not expire. The main advantage of this approach is 
that the sender’s congestion control mechanism does not oscillate un-necessarily, due to losses 
that occur in the WRAN. The LRM maintains duplicate copies of all TCP packets forwarded to 
receivers in the WRAN and removes the copies for which ACKs have been received and relayed 
to the sender in the Internet (lines 8 and 9 of Process ACK packets in table 2.1). It however keeps 
track of duplicate ACKs and if 3 duplicate ACKs are received or its local timer expires, it is 
treated as an indication of a lost packet resulting in appropriate packets being retransmitted out 
of duplicate buffer. Sending of new or duplicate packets is kept within the limit of advertised 
window size of the receiver (line 7 of Process data packets in table 2.1). The Fast Retransmit 










Table 2.1: Local Loss Recovery Algorithm implemented at the CRN base station. 
Data: Duplicate_ACK_count, Lost_pkt_number, flight_size 
Result: Local Loss Recovery at CRN Base Station. 
Initialization: Duplicate_ACK_count  , Lost_pkt_number  , flight_size   
Process ACK Packets 
for every packet in ACK buffer do 
1.     if ACK number is equal to Largest ACK number received do 
2.          increment  Duplicate_ACK_count 
3.          if  Duplicate_ACK_count  >  3 (i.e., case for fast retransmit option) do 
4.                Packet is lost 
5.                Retrieve lost packet number from ACK 
6.                Retransmit lost packet from local buffer 
7.          else 
8.                 Relay ACK back to sender 
9.                 Remove copy of data packet from duplicate buffer 
10.        end if 
11.   end if 
end for 
 
Process Data Packets 
 
while sessions are established between sender and receiver do 
1.    if flight_size = 0 do 
2.           if no ACK is pending do 
3.                 send new data packets from data packet buffer 
4.           end if 
5.    else 
6.           if largest ACK number received = ACK number expected do 
7.                 send new packets from local data packet buffer equal to advertised window 
8.           else 
9.                 if retransmission timer has expired OR 3 duplicate ACKs received do 
10.                       send duplicate packets from local duplicate buffer for pending ACKs 
11.               end if 
12.         end if 





2.3.2 Split TCP Connections 
Our second approach to boost TCP throughput for data transfers across a WRAN is to 
implement what we call a split TCP. Differences between existing split TCP mechanisms [19], 
[20], [21] and our approach are: 
• Our approach does not require modifications in either  the source or the destination;  
• It is specifically designed for IEEE 802.22 WRANs;  
• It pre-acknowledges TCP packets to shield the sender from unusually large spectrum 
sensing delays.  
 The BS implements this scheme with a module similar to LRM, which Pre-
Acknowledges TCP packets received at the BS, on behalf of the receiver in WRAN, effectively 
sending spoofed ACKs to the sender. This module is called the Pre-Acknowledgement Module 
(PAM). PAM maintains the state of all TCP connections traversing the BS, and just as the LRM, 
maintains a duplicate buffer for every TCP connection to ensure delivery of all of its packets. 
PAM also does not implement the complete TCP and its congestion control mechanism; however 
it restricts the number of packets transmitted to the receiver’s advertised window size along with 
local timers for reliable delivery. Unlike LRM, values for PAM’s retransmission timers are not 
associated with the sender’s RTO interval because in this case the sender’s transmissions are 
independent of losses or delays in the WRAN. Therefore, PAM’s local timers can be configured 
to suit the requirements of WRAN.   
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Algorithm of PAM is similar to LRM as shown in figure-6, with following exceptions: (i) 
whenever new packets are received at the BS from a sender in the Internet, an Acknowledgement 
is immediately sent to sender, and (ii) when an ACK is received from the receiver in WRAN, it 
is dropped and corresponding duplicate packets are dropped from duplicate buffer. Packet 
retransmissions out of duplicate buffer are triggered when the BS’s local timer expires or with 
the receipt of 3 duplicate acknowledgements to trigger Fast Retransmission. 
2.4 Discussion on proposed approaches 
The split TCP connection approach for boosting TCP performance uses spoofed 
acknowledgements by the BS which essentially breaks the end-to-end semantics of a TCP 
connection since a packet is acknowledged to its sender whereas it might not have been received 
by its intended receiver. This situation may not be acceptable to certain applications that work on 
the guarantees from TCP regarding actual delivery of a packet that is acknowledged. However, 
in situations where TCP RTO interval is comparable to fine sensing duration of the WRAN, pre-
acknowledgement might be the only option for preventing the TCP congestion control algorithm 
to timeout repeatedly and incorrectly attributing it to congestion. On the other hand, local 
recovery of lost packets by the BS preserves end-to-end semantics of TCP connections and 
provides a throughput boost as well. Therefore, the solution with pre-acknowledgements by BS 
may be selected for applications such as file transfer that may not be concerned with preserving 
end-to-end semantics while local loss recovery may be selected for the rest. 
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The main advantage of our schemes is that they provide throughput boost transparently i.e. 
without any need for changes in the end systems making them ideal for initial deployment of a 
WRAN. 
2.5 Performance Evaluation 
We consider a file transfer application in which a node in an IEEE 802.22 WRAN 
communicates with an FTP server in the Internet. We have developed a simulator to model a 
WRAN in which the BS and its associated CPEs resort to DSA to communicate with each other 
while the BS acts as gateway to Internet for the WRAN. Every node (CPE) in the network is 
equipped with a single radio transceiver that can be tuned to one channel at a time, however all 
nodes in the network are tuned to the same channel and the use or switching to/from a specific 
channel is controlled by the BS. The TCP module of our simulator implements slow start, 
congestion avoidance and fast retransmission schemes. However, since there have been various 
values for RTO interval for TCP implementations, we have also studied the impact of varying its 
values in our simulations. The downlink bandwidth from BS to CPEs is 1.5 Mbps downlink and 
uplink bandwidth per CPE is 384 kbps [13], [17]. The receiver of a TCP packet never delays an 
outgoing ACK for piggybacking i.e. it sends one ACK for every packet received. Bandwidth 
between the WRAN BS and FTP server is assumed to be 10 Mbps and file size for FTP transfer 





Figure 2.5: Performance of Proposed Solutions at various Loss Rates 
 
Figure 2.5 shows the performance of our proposed solutions in comparison with TCP where 
the figure shows TCP performance at packet loss rates of 0.5% and 2% for the WRAN link 
whereas our proposed schemes were run with 10% packet loss rate in the WRAN. As it is 
evident, our proposed schemes increase the throughput by 20 times.  
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show the performance of our proposed schemes individually where the 
simulations were run for packet loss rates from 0.5% to 10% and the overall file transfer times 
(y-axis) were recorded against varying fine sensing probabilities (x-axis) form 0 to 90%. The 
difference in performance of local loss recovery and pre-acknowledgement schemes can be 
observed because in case of local recovery, the sender does not send new packets unless the 
losses in WRAN have been recovered by the BS, whereas for pre-acknowledgement, the sender 
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can send new packets at the full capacity of the Internet link and is not restricted due to losses 
and delays in the WRAN. In this way, losses in the WRAN have some impact on the overall 
throughput of local loss recovery mechanism but none for pre-acknowledgement scheme. 
Figure 2.6: Performance of Local Loss Recovery at various Loss Rates 
Figure 2.7: Performance of Split TCP (Pre-ACK) at various Loss Rates. 


























































































Figure 2.8: Performance comparison at Fine Sensing Duration 5% of TCP RTO. 
Figure 2.9: Performance comparison at Fine Sensing Duration 15% of TCP RTO. 
 
 






















































































 Figures 2.8 and 2.9 show a comparison of TCP’s performance with our proposed solutions, 
at fine sensing durations 5% and 15% of TCP RTO intervals respectively, where the packet loss 
rate is kept constant at 0.2% for WRAN and 0.01% for Internet. In addition to preventing the fine 
sensing periods to interfere with TCP RTO interval, our schemes provide better throughput even 
when there are no fine sensing periods, because they are also able to recover from packet losses 
without having the sender TCP being affected by them. 
 Our proposed solutions perform better than TCP in scenarios where TCP flows suffer heavy 
packet losses and the sender has to invoke its congestion control mechanism very frequently. On 
the other hand, our solutions shield the sender from adverse effects of losses in the WRAN. 
When compared with each other, the two proposed solutions exhibit different performance as 
well. Split TCP connection with Pre-Acknowledgements has better performance than the local 
loss recovery by BS, but may be a less favorable option when it comes to preserving the end-to-
end semantics of a TCP connection. However, we propose that the choice of selecting a transfer 
mechanism other than TCP, be negotiated by CPEs with the BS at the time of joining the WRAN 
or for specific TCP flows. 
2.6 Conclusion 
 In this work we have shown that TCP performance is affected adversely due to PU activity 
in a WRAN, DSA by the un-licensed users and associated quiet periods that can be comparable 
with RTO interval of the sender’s TCP, a scenario which can trigger TCP’s congestion control 
mechanism un-necessarily and fruitlessly.  We have shown that our solutions transparently 
remedy this situation by coping well with packet losses that are inherent to the wireless medium 
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as well as resulting from inaccuracies in detection of PUs and network-wide quiet periods for 
spectrum sensing. To the best of our knowledge, there is however, no work that analyses TCP 
performance in the context of an IEEE 802.22 WRAN, or proposes solutions that would result in 
throughput boost for these networks. Currently we are investigating the impact of DSA in a 
multi-hop cognitive radio network such as IEEE 802.11af. 
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CHAPTER 3: REPUTATION AWARE SPECTRUM SENSING AGAINST 
SPECTRUM SENSING DATA FALSIFICATION ATTACKS 
Low Power Auxiliary Devices (LPAD) that operate in the analog TV bands can be registered 
with the FCC [1] in order to protect themselves from interference from other White Space 
Devices (WSD) that operate opportunistically in the same spectrum bands. By registering 
specific spectrum bands, the LPADs become PUs of the allocated spectrum bands. These LPADs 
include wireless microphones, intercom/talk back systems, in-ear monitors, audio instrument 
links and cueing equipment and have a typical transmission range between 100 and 200 meters 
[1]. A CRN [2] on the other hand may be much bigger in size as compared with the transmission 
range of the PUs. Collaborative spectrum sensing becomes essential in such situations since PU's 
signal may only be received by a small subset of the SU nodes. Therefore, the FC has to rely on 
spectrum sensing reports from SUs spread across the CRN.  
Collaborative spectrum sensing can also be favorable to malicious nodes in the network that 
may provide false spectrum sensing reports, a byzantine attack called Spectrum Sensing Data 
Falsification (SSDF) attack [3-7, 12]. Such an attack may adversely affect spectrum sensing 
decisions, which in turn may cause harmful interference to the PUs or deny the use of the vacant 
spectrum bands to the CRN. An SSDF attack may be aimed at gaining spectrum opportunities for 
the malicious nodes' own advantage or to disrupt CRN operation. As shown in the next section, 
efforts have been made to defend against SSDF attacks in CRNs, but there is a lack of research 
to deal with the situation where PUs are mobile and their transmission range is small as 
compared with the overall CRN size. 
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Reputation systems have been used frequently in computer networks to guard against 
malicious behavior from its entities. Reputation score typically represents an entity’s long term 
contribution in a network’s operation. The reputation scores are usually derived from some form 
of a voting mechanism and are used as weights in the system’s decision making process. 
Reputation systems are therefore a means to keep selfish or malicious entities from having an 
adverse influence on a network’s functioning. A CRN is vulnerable to selfish or malicious 
behavior because if left unchecked, the SSDF attacks may result in disruption of its operation to 
an extent that may even jeopardize its existence. 
3.1 Motivation 
Some reputation systems have been proposed for CRNs [6, 7] where final spectrum sensing 
decision at a given time is based on votes gathered from all SUs in the entire CRN. A node's vote 
is calculated as a function of its spectrum sensing report and its reputation score. However, any 
reputation system based on voting from all of network’s nodes will not work in situations where 
a PU's transmission can be received by only a small subset of nodes in the CRN. Therefore, a 
reputation system is needed for collaborative spectrum sensing which can cater for the short 
range PUs and will update the reputation scores of SUs that are within the range of a PU at a 






Figure 3.1: Ad hoc CRN with malicious nodes. Only the spectrum sensing reports sent by SU 
nodes in PU's coverage area should be considered for making final spectrum decisions and 
reputation updates. 
 
3.2 Proposed Work and Contribution 
In this chapter, we present a novel framework for collaborative spectrum sensing for ad hoc 
cognitive radio networks under byzantine SSDF attacks. This framework incorporates a spatio-
spectral anomaly detection
1
 system that functions in conjunction with a reputation system to 
detect malicious nodes in the CRN. Under typical network conditions and attack scenarios, our 
proposed framework is capable of reliably detecting malicious SUs and making the correct 
spectrum sensing decisions under SSDF attacks. This framework is especially suited for 
                                                 
1
 We use the terms outlier detection and anomaly detection interchangeably. 
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situations where PUs have smaller transmission ranges compared to the coverage area of the 
CRN as shown in figure 3.1. 
Specifically, we have made following contributions: 
 Identified limitations of existing CRN spectrum sensing and reputation systems in 
dealing with short-range PUs. 
 Developed a spectrum map construction system and formulated spatio-spectral 
anomaly detection for CRNs with short-range PUs. 
 Proposed a novel framework for integrating reputation with a spatio-spectral anomaly 
detection system to defend against SSDF attacks. 
 Presented an evaluation of our proposed framework under three variants of byzantine 
SSDF attacks. 
3.3 Related Work 
A comprehensive study of trust and reputation management systems proposed for CRNs is 
provided in [6]. Authors have given a taxonomy of reputation management systems and discuss 
various attack models and associated challenges pertaining to collaborative spectrum sensing in 
CRNs. A collaborative spectrum sensing scheme is presented in [7] which introduces Location 
Reliability and Malicious intent as trust parameters. The authors employ the Dempster-Shafer 
theory of evidence to evaluate trustworthiness of reporting secondary user nodes. The proposed 
scheme assigns trust values to different cells in the network which may receive abnormal levels 
of PU’s signal due to the effects of multi-path, signal fading and other factors in the radio 
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environment. Equal emphasis is given to the spectrum sensing reports from SUs using Equal 
Gain Combining while using trust values of the cells from where these reports were received as 
weights for data aggregation. This approach also assumes that the PU’s communication range is 
large enough to be received by the entire CRN and uses the spectrum sensing reports of all CRN 
nodes to reach the final spectrum decision. 
Authors in [8] propose a verification framework utilizing primary user emulation signals in 
order to confirm the correctness of spectrum sensing reports provided by SUs. An anti-jamming 
scheme is presented in [9] which uses a game theoretic approach to select a subset of channels 
that are not being used by a PU. The authors model the channel hopping, jamming and anti-
jamming process as a Markov decision process. To reduce the computational complexity of a 
policy iteration scheme, they propose a Q-Function approach. The transmission ranges of the 
SUs, PUs and the jammers are assumed to be large enough to cover the entire CRN. 
An anti-jamming spectrum access protocol is presented in [10]. The authors contend that 
existing solutions to model PU spectrum access and communications assume a priori knowledge 
of states and traffic statistics. In order to assume a realistic scenario, the authors formulate the 
problem of anti-jamming multichannel access in CRNs and solve it as a non-stochastic multi-
armed bandit problem where the SUs adaptively choose their channel hopping sequence. As with 
other solutions, this approach also assumes that the transmission ranges of both the PUs and the 
SUs are large enough to be received in the entire CRN coverage area. Authors in [11] tackle the 
problem of PU emulation, an attack aimed at denying the use of vacant spectrum bands to the 
CRN. In order to evade the pursuing jammer, the SUs employ a game theoretic channel hopping 
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strategy where they have to employ a strategy that would ensure the utilization of the best among 
the set of vacant channels. The game is analyzed by finding the optimal strategy of the jammer 
sing the framework of partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP). 
Another collaborative spectrum sensing scheme is presented in [12] which uses pre-filtering 
to remove extreme spectrum sensing reports and a simple average combining scheme to calculate 
spectrum sensing decisions while considering all reports that pass the pre-filtering phase. This 
approach also assumes PU's transmission range to be large enough to cover entire CRN and their 
attack model is limited only to ‘Always-ON’ or ‘Always-OFF’ attacks. A secure and distributed 
spectrum sensing technique is presented in [13] which assumes that the PU’s transmission range 
is large enough to be received in the entire CRN. It characterizes the spectrum sensing problem 
as an M-ary hypotheses testing problem and considers a cluster-based CRN where cluster heads 
receive and process raw spectrum sensing data before forwarding to the FC. Because the authors 
assume that the PU’s transmission range is large enough to be received by every node in the 
network with varying signal strength, this approach cannot be adopted for a CRN in which a PU 
has much smaller transmission range. 
3.4 System Model and Assumptions 
We model the Ad hoc CRN (figure 3.1) as a region in which the PUs and SUs are mobile 
under general mobility model. There can be one or more PUs operating within the CRN at any 
given time. To guard against PU emulation attacks, there is a need to uniquely identify all 
transmitters. With techniques such as Radio Frequency Fingerprinting (RFF) [14] all devices in 
the CRN as well as the PU can be uniquely identified. Therefore, in this chapter, we treat 
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uniquely identifying a transmitter as a black box and assume that nodes in the CRN as well as the 
FC are capable of uniquely identifying every other device in the CRN area and malicious nodes 
in the CRN cannot provide spectrum sensing reports on behalf of other nodes. Table 3.1 lists the 
notations and acronyms used in this chapter. 
 
Table 3.1: List of Notations and acronyms – Chapter 3 
Notation Definition 
       Received power (RSS) at node i at time k 
   Max width of annular region of RSS level m 
     Location of SU i at time k 
     Reported RSS level of SU i at time k 
     Distance between node j and k   
  PU detection threshold (RSS level above which PU is considered detected 
     Minimum distance between RSS levels i and j 
     Maximum distance between RSS levels i and j 
     Classification of node j being outlier or normal at time k   
   Outlier / normal entry for node j  in lower tier of reputation table  
   Malicious / honest entry for node j  in upper  tier of reputation table  
     Spectrum decision with soft combining for node j at time k 
  
  Final spectrum decision for CRN at time k  
PU Primary User 
SU Secondary User 
FC Fusion Center 
RSS Received Signal Strength 
CDT Channel Detection Time 




A spectrum band is considered to be vacant when it is not being used by any PU, and 
occupied otherwise. Reputation update cycle is termed as the Channel Detection Time (CDT) 
slot during which SUs report their sensed Received Signal Strength (RSS) to the FC, a special 
SU node in the CRN selected to aggregate spectrum sensing data from SUs and make spectrum 
sensing decisions. Selection of FC may be carried out in a similar manner as cluster heads are 
selected in various kinds of networks e.g. [15]. However, selection of FC is out of the scope of 
this work and assumed to be achieved by other protocols. It is also assumed that SUs have an on-
board GPS device, know their location at all time and include this information in every spectrum 
sensing report. 
After every CDT slot  , each SU   sends its spectrum sensing report to the FC including the 
RSS value        and its location       . This is essential for the FC to construct a spatio-spectral 
map of the entire CRN which is then utilized to calculate spectrum occupancy decision. We also 
define a Detection Threshold   which corresponds to the RSS level below which a PU’s signal is 
not considered to have been detected. Because of the limited transmission range of a PU, it is 
possible that the FC does not receive PU's signal directly when the PU is far away. For a robust 
system design, we assume that the FC always relies on the reports from the SUs to construct the 
spatio-spectral map of the CRN. 
Attack Model: With the presence of malicious nodes in the CRN which may provide false 
spectrum sensing information to the FC, the accuracy of the spectrum sensing decisions could be 
severely degraded thereby jeopardizing the operation of the CRN. Malicious nodes may provide 
false spectrum sensing report or misreport their current location in order to affect the outcome of 
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spectrum report aggregation. Although it is possible for malicious nodes in a CRN to launch 
various kinds of attacks such as the PU emulation (PUE) attack or jamming attacks that target 
different channels including the common control channel, but SSDF attack is the only focus of 
this chapter. Presence of malfunctioning nodes, i.e., Byzantine Failure is treated in the same 
manner as a SSDF attack. 
3.5 Reputation Aware Spectrum Sensing Framework 
Spectrum sensing reports from SUs in detecting a PU can vary significantly because of small 
communication range of the PU relative to the size of CRN and mobility of both SUs and PUs. 
In addition, this situation is very suitable for malicious nodes to launch SSDF attacks and cause 
errors in spectrum decisions. It is therefore vital for the FC to identify malicious nodes and 
prevent them from inducing spectrum decision errors. To detect malicious nodes and guard 
against SSDF attacks, our proposed reputation aware spectrum sensing framework has four 
components: 
 Semi-supervised spatio-spectral anomaly detection. 
 Spectrum sensing data aggregation. 
 Spectrum map construction. 
 Reputation management. 
We describe each of these components in detail in this section. Description of notations is 
given in table 3.1. 
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3.5.1 Semi-Supervised Spatio-Spectral Anomaly Detection 
Collection of spectrum reports is assumed to be carried out with existing routing protocols 
and is not the focus of this work. Here we briefly present the process through which RSS is 
calculated by the SUs and when reported through spectrum sensing reports, converted into 
discrete levels by the FC. Next we demonstrate how the FC uses the RSS levels to detect 
anomalous behavior by SUs. 
3.5.1.1 RSS Calculation 
RSS is a powerful tool that has been extensively used in wireless networks for various 
purposes such as transmitter localization [16], ranging [17] and construction of radio 
environment maps [18] (also called spectrum maps). Since FCC has mandated presence of online 
databases of licensed users of spectrum in a given geographical area, it is reasonable to assume 
that PUs’ communication parameters are known to the CRN. For the purpose of detecting 
anomalies in spectrum reports as well as localizing PU and construction of its radio environment 
map, we leverage the known characteristics of PUs' communications for calculating RSS values 
in different parts of the CRN. 
Let        denote the RSS of PU's signal at secondary user    at time  , which can be 
calculated according to [19] as follows: 
                 
 
       
  (1) 
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where      is the antenna gain of node  ,    is the transmitted power of the PU and    is antenna 
gain of the PU,   is PU's signal wavelength and      is distance between the PU and receiving SU 
  at time  . From equation 1 we define RSS level  at a given distance     from PU as a discrete 
region defined by    as the width of a ring-shaped annular region. A node  , whose reported RSS 
satisfies the inequality 
                               (2)  
belongs to RSS level  , where   is the number of discrete RSS levels a PU's transmission is 
divided into. RSS level    means that a SU is not within PU's transmission range and cannot 
detect its signals. 
3.5.1.2 Spatio-Spectral Anomaly Detection 
A spectrum sensing report from a SU contains the RSS as well as the node’s current location, 
both of which can be falsely reported by malicious nodes. We employ a semi-supervised 
anomaly detection system to detect whether a spectrum sensing report falls within the expected 
normal values for reported RSS level. We define the normal behavior for reporting SUs in the 
form of upper and lower bounds on the distance between a given pair of RSS levels reported by 
two SU nodes. These lower and upper bounds on normal behavior are formulated as matrices φ 
and ψ respectively, elements of these behavior matrices are derived as follows: 
     { 
∑                                 
   
     
                                                         
∑                                
   




     ∑    
 
      ∑    
 
    (4) 
where the element      is the minimum distance and the element      is the maximum distance 
between two SU nodes that reported RSS levels i and j, respectively and     is width of the 
annular region of the RSS level . 
After gathering all reports from the SUs, the FC performs a pairwise comparison of every 
reported RSS level and classifies the distance between the nodes under consideration as either a 
normal or abnormal distance. This classification is performed by comparing the distance with 
both the minimum as well as maximum distance matrices. Consider the set of spectrum sensing 
reports S in a given CDT slot, to be: 
       (     )   (     )       (     )               (5) 
where   is the number of SUs in the CRN,    is the location and    is the reported RSS level of 
node  . Distance between nodes   and   is given by      which can be calculated from their 
reported location information. Classification of a distance between a pair of nodes   and  , 
denoted by       is given as: 
     {
                                                  
                                                          
 (6) 
where        represents that the distance is within normal range and -1 means that the distance 
is classified as abnormal. At the end of distance classification, the number of normal and 
abnormal distances of a given node from all other reporting nodes is compared. As shown in 
figure 3.2, if majority of a node's distances are normal then the node is considered honest in the 
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current CDT slot, otherwise it is treated as an outlier node and its reputation score is 
decremented by the reputation management system.  
Figure 3.2: Anomaly detection in reported RSS (a) SUs that reported PU's presence including a 
malicious node. (b) Distances from an honest node to all other reporting SUs. Distance to 
malicious node is abnormal, other distances are normal. (c) Distances from a malicious node to 
all other reporting SUs. Since majority of its distances are abnormal, the node in the middle is 
classified as outlier. 
 
The final classification of a node as an outlier, denoted by      is given as per algorithm 1 as 
follows: 
     {
                ∑        
 
                          




where        represents that node   is a normal node at time slot  , and 1 represents an 
outlier/abnormal node at CDT slot  . All the nodes that reported the presence of PU on the 
spectrum and classified as normal nodes in equation 7 are next used in the spectrum report 
aggregation process to reach a spectrum decision explained in next subsection. The algorithm for 
anomaly detection in spectrum sensing reports is given in Table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.2: Spatio-Spectral Anomaly Detection Algorithm 
Data:                                 
Result: Outlier Classification of ( ) of SU node 
begin 
1.   for        
2.         for        
3.               if                                 
4.                           
5.               else 
6.                           
7.               end if 
8.         end 
9.   end 
10. if     







3.5.2 Spectrum Sensing Data Aggregation 
Typically, spectrum sensing reports are aggregated using voting mechanisms based on either 
the majority rule, the AND rule or the OR rule [20]. As evident from figure 3.1, these 
aggregation rules cannot be applied in situations where PU's transmission range is much smaller 
as compared with the overall size of the CRN. This is because even in the absence of malicious 
nodes, the number of nodes receiving PU's signal is expected to be much less than the total 
number of nodes in the CRN. Therefore, our proposed spectrum data aggregation technique 
determines the presence or absence of PU within an area of CRN that is equal to the PU's 
transmission range. When all spectrum reports are collected at FC, each node is classified as 
behaving normally or abnormally in every CDT slot. This node classification at each CDT slot 
can be viewed as a node's instantaneous reputation; however, the reputation score of every node 
used in our proposed system is accumulated with the passage of time and can be viewed as its 
long-term reputation. As discussed in subsequent sections, our proposed reputation scheme is 
composed of three-phases. 
3.5.2.1 Report Aggregation with Soft Combining 
For the purpose of data aggregation we use soft-combining technique where, instead of its 
spectrum sensing decision, a CRN node reports its RSS level to the FC which then aggregates 
these reports to calculate its final spectrum sensing decision. Nodes whose spectrum sensing 
reports are considered anomalous in current CDT slot are classified as outliers and their 
reputation scores are decremented. Spectrum sensing reports that pass the anomaly detection 
phase are next processed in data aggregation. In our reputation-aware spectrum sensing 
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framework a node has to have a minimum reputation score to be considered honest at the current 
CDT slot for its report to be included in calculation of spectrum decision. Calculation of 
reputation score and classification of a node as either honest or malicious is explained in the next 
section. The three phase approach for behavior classification explained in the following sub-
section is used because a malicious node may report correct spectrum sensing results in some of 
the CDT slots to hide its SSDF attacks with a few correct reports as well as to improve its 
reputation score. 
3.5.2.2 Spectrum State Decision 
In a CDT slot  , if no honest SU reported presence of a PU's signal then the spectrum 
decision    is vacant. If there were some reports from honest nodes that indicated presence of 
PU's signal on the spectrum then a majority vote is conducted based on a Detection Threshold   
to determine the spectrum sensing decision: 
        {
                              




               ∑        
 
                                       
                                                                   
 (9)  
 where      is the spectrum sensing decision (occupied = 1,  vacant = -1) from report      of node 
  and   
  is the final spectrum sensing decision (occupied = 1, vacant = 0) of the CRN for CDT 
slot  . A node once labeled as malicious may regain an honest status by providing correct 
spectrum sensing reports however, the rate of reputation improvement is much slower than its 
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decline. This difference in the rate of reputation change ensures that the malicious nodes do not 
manipulate their reputation scores to their advantage. 
3.5.3 Spectrum Map Construction 
If the spectrum report aggregation results in a decision that the spectrum is occupied then 
spectrum map has to be constructed and the PU has to be localized. The accuracy of PU 
localization however depends on the number of SUs in PU's range as well as the RSS levels 
received by those SUs. This phenomenon is represented by the errors in detecting malicious 
nodes as well as incorrectly labeling honest nodes as malicious as shown in the performance 
evaluation (section 3.6). 
For localization of PU with the help of RSS values calculated above, we need a technique to 
fit a circle to the locations of SUs that report same RSS levels in a given time slot. A number of 
methods exist to fit a circle to a collection of data points such as full least squares, average of 








Figure 3.3: Error in spectrum map construction using circular regression with a single RSS level. 
Final PU localization is done with weighted average of localizations with all of the M RSS 
levels. 
 
3.5.3.1 Circular Regression with SU locations 
We employ the Kåsa method of circular regression [21] shown in figure 3.3 which is 
summarized as follows: On a two-dimensional plane we want to find a circle that best fits the 
given set of points that represent reporting SUs locations in a sense of least squares 
approximation. Suppose the fitted circle has the center point (   ) i.e. the PU's calculated 
location and a radius of R that represents PU's transmission range. The observed set of points 
that represent   reporting SUs' locations is given by: 
     (     ) (     )     (     )               (10) 
If all of the points (     ) fall exactly on the circle, then equation (    )
  (    )
     is 
satisfied. If the SUs' locations under consideration are not on the circle then there exists a fitting 
50 
 
error    (    )
  (    )
     whose magnitude will be directly proportinal to the 
distance of points (     ) from the true circle. 
The objective function   for the Kåsa method is to minimize the summation of the above 
fitting errors of all observed points i.e., SUs' reported locations: 
 (     )   ∑  (    )
  (    )
           (11) 
By using the transform                       , the above objective function 
becomes: 
       (     )   ∑    
    
            
  
    (12) 
The derivative of   in equation (12) with respect to          yields a system of linear 
equations: 
∑  
   ∑      ∑     ∑  (  
    
 ) (13) 
∑      ∑  
   ∑     ∑  (  
    
 ) (14) 
∑    ∑        ∑(  
    
 ) (15) 
3.5.3.2 PU Localization 
Solving the system of linear equations (13 - 15) gives          and thus the center of the 
circle, i.e., the location of PU (   ) and is given by: 
     ⁄     
 
 ⁄  (16) 
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It is to be noted that the center of the annular region calculated in equation (16) is the result 
of   SUs reporting the same RSS level. Greater value of   will in turn, increase the accuracy of 
PU localization. We carry out the same process of circular regression with each of the   RSS 
levels for which the number of reporting SUs is at least 3 because a smaller number greatly 
increases the fitting error. PU's localization with   RSS levels is done as follows: Let (      ) 
be the center of the annular region calculated for RSS level           . If     is the total 
number of SUs that reported PU's presence and    is the number of SUs that reported RSS level 
 , then the final location (     ) of the PU is calculated as a weighted average of   points as: 
   
     
 ⁄        
  
     
 ⁄  (17) 
If spectrum report aggregation concludes that the PU is on air then it is localized as shown 
above. Thereafter, the next step is to detect any malicious nodes that were within PU’s coverage 
area but did not report the presence of PU, an SSDF attack we refer to as the Induction attack 
which needs some additional processing at the FC. Detection of induction attack is carried out as 
follows: Let node   represent an honest node that reported RSS level    in current CDT slot and 
whose surrounding areas are being scanned next for the presence of non-reporting malicious 
node(s). Let        be the minimum distance between RSS levels   and RSS level 0 from 
equation (17), then any SU node at a distance less than        from node   that did not report the 
presence of PU is considered to be malicious because it lies within PU's transmission range and 




Figure 3.4: Two-tiered sliding window Reputation Table. 
 
3.5.4 Reputation Management 
During every CDT slot, reputation score for a SU may be decremented in any of the three 
subsections above because of anomalous behavior and incremented only if its contribution is  
positive in all of these steps. A reputation table is implemented as a two-tiered sliding window 
for every node in the CRN, as shown in figure 3.4. 
3.5.4.1 Reputation Update Phase-1 
After the anomaly detection phase when a node has been classified as behaving either 
normally or abnormally according to equation 7 a corresponding entry     is added in the lower 
tier of the reputation table, where an outlier entry corresponds to       and a normal entry 
corresponds to      . 
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3.5.4.2 Reputation Update Phase-2 
After spectrum reports are aggregated and the final spectrum decision   
  reached, SUs 
whose spectrum sensing reports contributed positively towards reaching the final decision are 
rewarded and the SUs whose reports contributed negatively towards reaching the final spectrum 
sensing reports are punished by the reputation system by adding relevant malicious / honest 
entries     in the lower tier of the reputation table. 
3.5.4.3 Reputation Update Phase-3 
The reputation system takes different courses of action for the two spectrum decisions: If the 
spectrum decision was ‘vacant’, then all nodes that reported presence of PU’s signal are 
punished by adding a malicious entry      in the lower tier of the reputation table. However, if 
the spectrum decision was ‘occupied’ then the FC has to first determine the location of the PU in 
order to reward or punish the nodes in its coverage area only, as shown in figure 3.1. Based on 
the spectrum reports of honest nodes, the FC then constructs a spectrum map of the PU and 
calculates the expected spectrum sensing reports of SUs within PU's transmission range. For a 
given CRN node, if reported and expected spectrum sensing reports do not match, then a 
malicious entry        is added in the lower tier of the node’s reputation table. Otherwise, an 
‘honest’ entry       is added in the reputation table: 
        {
                                             
                                                           
 (18) 
 Classification of a CRN node j to be malicious or otherwise at any given time is represented 
by an entry    in the upper tier of the reputation table as: 
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   {
                     ∑                    
                                            
 (19) 
 where   is the size of the reputation table and   is the threshold for a node   to be considered 
honest. A summary of reputation update process is shown in Algorithm 2. 
  The two-tiered implementation of reputation table as shown in figure 3.4 is used to 
normalize the difference between the speed of a node’s mobility and the frequency of its 
spectrum sensing reports. Consider an SU moving at 3 m/sec and a CDT slot equal to 100 msec. 
If it took the SU 7 seconds to move from its current RSS level to an adjacent one, it would 
generate 70 spectrum sensing reports during this time period all of which would be highly 
correlated in a single-tier implementation of reputation table. In our two-tiered implementation  
once the lower tier of the reputation table is filled, a corresponding entry    is added in the 
upper tier of the table and the lower tier is reset. The decision for adding an honest or a malicious 
entry in the upper tier of the reputation table is reached based on majority rule applied on the 
lower tier. The algorithm for reputation management is given in Table 3.3. Implementation of the 
reputation table as a sliding window serves two purposes: first, it represents the latest behavior of 
a node and prevents malicious nodes from taking advantage of their reputation score from distant 
past and second, it gives a chance to nodes incorrectly labeled as malicious to improve their 






Table 3.3: Reputation Management Algorithm 
Data:   
     
Result: malicious/honest Classification of SU nodes 
begin 
1.   for every CDT slot   do 
2.         detect and remove anomalous reports   (phase-1) 
3.         calculate final spectrum decision   
  
4.         punish/reward SUs by comparing reports   and final spectrum decision   
  
5.         if   
    then 
6.               localize PU 
7.               calculate expected spectrum reports of SUs 
8.               punish non-reporting SUs (phase-3) 
9.         else if   
    then 
10.             punish SUs that reported PU's presence 
11.       end if 
12. end for 
end 
3.6 Performance Evaluation 
In this section we present an evaluation of our proposed reputation aware collaborative 
spectrum sensing framework to defend against three different variants of SSDF attacks.  These 
variants include Induction attack, Denial of Service attack and the Spectrum Sensing Report 
Reversal attack. For the purpose of our simulations, we define these three attacks in the 
following subsection. 
3.6.1 Variants of SSDF Attacks 
3.6.1.1 Induction Attack 
A CRN is expected to utilize vacant spectrum bands in an opportunistic manner i.e., to vacate 
it whenever a PU is sensed to be communicating. As per FCC regulations SUs must vacate the 
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spectrum upon arrival of the PU within a specified time called Maximum Detection Time or 
MDT [22]. The Induction attack refers to malicious nodes reporting absence of PUs from the 
spectrum band which in fact, might currently be using the spectrum. The purpose of this attack is 
to trick the CRN into believing that the spectrum is vacant and “induce” transmission by SUs 
thereby causing interference to the PUs. This attack can have devastating and far reaching effect 
on the CRN, as it can cause harmful interference to PU's signal and can jeopardize the existence 
of the CRN. 
3.6.1.2 Denial of Service Attack 
The Denial of Service (DoS) attack is intended by a malicious node in the CRN to deny the 
use of vacant spectrum bands to SUs. Because of short transmission range of the PUs, FC relies 
on spectrum sensing reports from the SUs to determine if the spectrum is vacant or occupied in 
order for it to be utilized by the CRN. However, malicious nodes launching a DoS attack can 
provide false spectrum sensing report always indicating that the spectrum is currently being used 
by the PUs thereby preventing the CRN from utilizing spectrum opportunities. The malicious 
nodes in the CRN may launch a DoS attack in order to gain unfair advantage over other SUs, 
utilizing the spectrum for their own communications or simply to deny the same to the rest of the 
CRN. Although such an attack would not cause interference to the PUs, it will severely degrade 
CRN's system performance by denying the spectrum opportunities to the honest nodes. 
3.6.1.3 Report Reversal Attack 
The spectrum sensing Report Reversal attack is essentially a combination of the two attacks 
described above i.e. the Denial of Service attack and the Induction attack. A malicious node will 
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launch a DoS attack only when the spectrum is sensed to be idle and an Induction attack will be 
launched only when the spectrum is being used by one or more PUs. On the other hand, a 
malicious node launching a Report Reversal attack will always provide a spectrum sensing report 
for spectrum’s state that is the reverse of the actual PU's spectrum utilization state. For the 
previous two attack types, a malicious node will have to wait for the correct PU's spectrum state 
to launch an SSDF attack however, when a malicious node intends to launch a report reversal 
attack it will always be able to do so whether the PU is idle or active on the spectrum. 
As we will demonstrate in the next sub-sections, the Report Reversal attack is intuitively 
much more detrimental to the collaborative spectrum sensing and the overall CRN operation as 
compared with DoS attack or the Induction attack. Another highlight of our simulations' results 
is that the DoS and Report reversal attacks need much fewer number of malicious nodes to 




Figure 3.5: Average number of SUs in PU's range in dense and sparse networks. 
 
3.6.2 Simulation Setup 
For the purpose of evaluating our proposed framework for defending against aforementioned 
SSDF attacks, we have considered an ad hoc CRN of size 1000m x 1000m and the PU and the 
SUs whether honest or malicious, are mobile with their speed varying between 0 and 4m/s which 
represents a CRN user moving around on foot. The maximum transmission ranges for both the 
PU and the SUs is 200 meters. We have carried out simulations for both dense (100 nodes) and 
sparse (50 nodes) network configurations. The impact of collusion among malicious nodes in an 
ad hoc CRN is beyond the scope of this work. 
Figure 3.5 shows the number of SUs within PU’s transmission range at any given time during 
a simulation run with the mean 4.7 and variance 5.1 for a sparse network and a mean 12.7 and 
variance 9.2 for a dense network. The threshold   for a node to be considered as malicious is 
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kept at 3 malicious entries in the reputation window with the total reputation window size   
  . Spectrum sensing reports are generated by the SUs in every CDT slot which equals 100 
msec. At every CDT slot the sensing reports are then aggregated by the FC to reach the final 
spectrum sensing decision   
  as per equation (9) for the current CDT slot. All the graphs 
represent results that are averaged over 100 simulation runs. Every simulation run is 300 seconds 
in length unless specified otherwise.  







Figure 3.7: Spectrum Decision Accuracy under Spectrum Report Reversal Attack. 
 
3.6.3 Simulation Results 
Spectrum sensing accuracy is the most important metric with regards to the collaborative 
spectrum sensing because the existence of the CRN depends on accurate spectrum sensing 
decisions. Performance of our proposed reputation aware collaborative spectrum sensing 
framework with respect to spectrum sensing accuracy is shown in figures 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 for the 
three variants of SSDF byzantine attack, where   represents PU’s 
spectrum usage probability. As the number of malicious users in the CRN grows, it will have a 
negative impact on the overall spectrum sensing decision accuracy. Our proposed framework 
successfully detects malicious behavior and reaches correct spectrum sensing decisions up to 
99.3% of the time when malicious nodes are 10% of the entire SUs which is a fairly large 
number of malicious nodes. Spectrum decision accuracy of our proposed framework drops to 
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94% when the number of malicious nodes increases to 25% of the CRN, a number that can be 
considered a highly unlikely number of malicious nodes in a network. 
Figure 3.8: Spectrum Decision Accuracy under (a) Induction attack (b) All attacks combined. 
 
Among the three variants of SSDF attacks, it can be seen from figure 3.8(b) that Report 
Reversal attack has the most severe impact on the spectrum sensing accuracy while the Induction 
attack has the least. To elaborate consider this: In order to launch an Induction attack in a CRN a 
malicious node has to report the absence of the PU in the spectrum band when it is actually been 
used by a PU. The honest nodes in the vicinity of a malicious node will however report the 
presence of the PU and the attempted attack on the CRN will fail. This makes the Induction 
attack comparatively difficult to launch as well as difficult to detect by the FC. In order to find 
out exactly how difficult it is for a malicious node to launch an Induction attack without 
collusion with other malicious nodes, we increased the malicious node population to a highly 




success rate was around 6% for a sparse network and our reputation framework was able to 
achieve a spectrum decision accuracy of 94%. Therefore, our proposed framework achieves 
spectrum decision accuracy of around 99.3% within a reasonable malicious node probability of 
10% for all the three types of SSDF attacks. 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the speed and accuracy of our proposed 
ramework to detect malicious nodes in dense as well as sparse networks under the three variants 
of SSDF attack. The figures demonstrate that the majority of malicious nodes are detected within 















Figure 3.10: Incorrect labeling of honest SUs as malicious under various SSDF attacks. 
 
 
Figures 3.10(a), (b) and (c) show the error rate of categorizing an honest node as a malicious 
node (labeled as ‘False Detection %’) by our proposed reputation framework under the three 
variants of SSDF attack. Figure 3.10(d) shows the long term dynamic for false detection 
percentage under the three SSDF attacks which is close to 30%. It is however pointed out that for 





for simulating induction attack as opposed to the other two attacks for which the malicious node 
population in CRN was kept at 30%. 
3.7 Conclusion 
Malicious nodes may provide false spectrum sensing reports in order to disrupt the operation 
of a CRN or to maximize spectrum opportunities for themselves. This can affect CRN's 
operation to an extent that may even jeopardize its existence. In this work we have proposed a 
novel reputation aware collaborative spectrum sensing framework based on spatio-spectral 
anomaly detection. Our proposed system is well suited for situations where the PU's 
communication range is limited within a sub-region of the CRN. Simulations of our system show 
that it is robust against SSDF attacks and can detect malicious behavior up to 99.3% of the time 
when malicious node density is within a reasonable range and is still very effective when the 
number of malicious nodes is even greater. Our proposed system is also flexible enough to be 
used where PU's communication range spans the entire CRN. 
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CHAPTER 4: ADAPTIVE SPECTRUM SENSING UNDER NOISE AND 
SMART JAMMING ATTACK 
Wireless Regional Area Network (WRAN) based on IEEE 802.22 standard [1, 2] referred to 
as CRN from here on, employs Cognitive Radio [3-6] techniques to provide broadband Internet 
access using the analog TV bands in an opportunistic, unlicensed and non-interfering basis. The 
TV bands made available by FCC for unlicensed use [4] by CRNs fall in the 54-698 MHz 
frequency range. To operate in a non-interfering manner, devices in a CRN are required to sense 
the spectrum periodically and vacate the spectrum band if they detect the presence of incumbent 
PU. In order to strike a balance between the conflicting goals of proper protection of incumbent 
PU’s communication and optimum QoS for SUs, CRNs employ a two-stage spectrum sensing 
approach: these stages are called fast sensing and fine sensing [1]. Fast sensing as the name 
suggests, usually takes 9~20 microseconds depending on the technique used [7] such as energy 
detection, and therefore can only report the presence or absence of a signal on the spectrum band 
and cannot determine the type of the received signal. On the other hand fine sensing employs 
sophisticated techniques for identification of signals present on the spectrum and may take up to 
160 msec [8] i.e. the entire duration of a super frame  also called the Channel Detection Time 
(CDT) [1, 2]. 
Due to large transmission range of 35~100 km, IEEE 802.22 standard employs collaborative 
spectrum sensing i.e. the CRN base station (BS) not only carries out its own spectrum sensing 
but also relies on spectrum sensing reports from SUs in order to determine the spectrum state. As 
part of the collaborative spectrum sensing, devices in a CRN are synchronized and carry out the 
mandatory fast sensing during every CDT slot. The result of fast sensing is reported by all SUs to 
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the BS which then decides if fine sensing needs to be carried out. To ensure that everyone in the 
CRN senses PU’s signals and not their own, quiet period for spectrum sensing are also 
synchronized. IEEE 802.22 standard mandates the CRN to always carry out fine sensing when 
the fast sensing stage reports presence of any signal on the spectrum [1]. As discussed 
subsequently, it is this static nature of spectrum sensing that can be exploited by malicious nodes 
in the CRN to launch smart jamming attacks and the adaptive spectrum sensing framework 
presented in this chapter is primarily aimed at modifying this specific static behavior of the IEEE 
802.22 standard. 
At the time when PU is not using the spectrum, a state referred to as spectrum opportunity for 
DSA, malicious users in the CRN can launch a Denial of Service (DoS) attack by jamming the 
frequency band currently being used by CRN, for the whole duration of every CDT. However, 
such an attack has the disadvantage of rendering the jammed frequency band unusable by the 
attacker as well and it requires a lot of transmission power. On the other hand an attacker can 
take advantage of the fixed nature of the two stage spectrum sensing mechanism by transmitting 
a short jamming signal during the fast sensing stage only. We call this kind of an attack as a 
smart jamming/denial of service attack. Since fast sensing stage is significantly shorter than the 
CDT, a smart jamming attack would consume far less energy than jamming the entire CDT slot 
and will force the rest of the CRN to carry out fine sensing denying them the spectrum 
opportunity with the additional benefit of the possibility of utilizing it for their own 
communications. In order to mitigate the effects of smart jamming attacks on spectrum 
opportunity utilization, an adaptive spectrum sensing technique is needed. 
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4.1 Motivation and Contributions 
The IEEE 802.22 standard imposes an upper bound on the maximum delay allowed for the 
detection of incumbent PU’s signal and for the CRN to vacate current channel. This time limit is 
called the Maximum Detection Time (MDT) [1, 5, 9] and is equal to 2 seconds. We leverage the 
MDT constraint to propose a framework for adaptive defense against smart jamming attack in 
IEEE 802.22 CRNs. We call this framework DS3: Dynamic and Smart Spectrum Sensing. The 
main difference between the spectrum sensing decision of existing IEEE 802.22 standard and our 
proposed DS3 framework is that whenever fast sensing stage reports presence of some signal on 
spectrum, the former always carries out fine sensing while DS3 dynamically adjusts the 
threshold for conducting fine sensing in response to an alert from fast sensing. As explained in 
section IV, the dynamic threshold depends on a cost minimization function in conjunction with 
the latest estimate of jamming attack severity. 
Specifically, following contributions are made: 
 Carried out an analysis of the impact of smart jamming/DoS attack on CRN's 
dynamic spectrum access. 
 Proposed a novel adaptive defense framework called DS3 which enables the CRN to 
thwart smart jamming attacks as well as improve spectrum utilization by SUs under 
noisy channel conditions. 
 Carried out simulation study of the proposed DS3 framework and demonstrated its 




4.2 Related Work 
Opportunistic spectrum access in CRNs makes them an easy target for attackers that may 
jeopardize its operation for their individual gains or merely because of malicious intent. 
Therefore, security of DSA in CRNs has been the focus of attention for many research efforts 
lately. This section provides an overview of related work and provides an insight as to how these 
studies differ from the work presented in this chapter.  
Byzantine failure and spectrum sensing data falsification attacks are considered in [10] and a 
defense mechanism based on filtering out suspicious spectrum reports with weighted sequential 
probability ratio test (WSPRT) is proposed. Measures to prevent jamming of Common Control 
Channel (CCC) in an ad hoc CRN are presented in [11]. It assumes that the jammers are aware of 
the protocol specifics as well as cryptographic quantities used to secure network operations. The 
authors propose two techniques to identify malicious nodes that act independently and those that 
collude to jam the CCC. They also propose generation and secure dissemination of hopping 
sequences for the CRN to elude jammers. This however is primarily aimed at defending against 
jamming the CCC through which spectrum sensing and other control data are shared. On the 
other hand, our work addresses defense against jamming of spectrum sensing itself.  
A collaborative spectrum sensing scheme is presented in [12] which introduces Location 
Reliability and Malicious intent as trust parameters. The authors employ the Dempster-Shafer 
theory of evidence to evaluate trustworthiness of reporting secondary user nodes. The proposed 
scheme assigns trust values to different cells in the network which may receive abnormal levels 
of PU’s signal due to the effects of multi-path, signal fading and other factors in the radio 
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environment. The approach adopted by the authors does not cater for a two-stage spectrum 
sensing and the possibility of a smart jamming attack by malicious nodes.  
Authors in [13 - 17] present various game theoretic approaches to defend against various 
jamming attacks in the collaborative spectrum sensing of CRNs. The common theme in all of 
these defense strategies against jamming is to hop to a channel that might not be jammed by the 
jammer. Our proposed adaptive spectrum sensing framework on the other hand, does not resort 
to channel hopping and evades jamming while staying in the same channel.  
A collaborative defense technique is presented in [18] where the SUs in a CRN defend 
against a collaborative DoS attack launched by sweeping and jamming the channels in the entire 
spectrum. The SUs make use of spatial and temporal diversity to form proxies in order to 
continue communicating. This work however does not consider that the jammer may seek to 
minimize its jamming power budget by jamming only the fast sensing stage. Also, the main 
defense against jamming attack is for the CRN to hop to another channel.  
Authors in [19] present a game theoretic approach to defend against jamming attacks in 
CRNs. They derive an optimal strategy for the SUs to decide whether to remain in the current 
band or to hop to another band by employing a Markov Decision Process approach. In addition 
to formulating a channel hopping strategy, the authors also propose a learning process through 
which SUs estimate current network conditions based on past observations using the maximum 
likelihood estimation technique and further incorporate this information in their defense strategy 
for optimization. This work also does not consider the two-stage spectrum sensing that is 
employed in the current IEEE 802.22 WRAN standard, and the defense against jamming is for 
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CRN to hop to another channel. Techniques to optimize the channel sensing duration under 
different SNR conditions are proposed in [20]. However, the work does not consider intentional 
jamming attacks.  
To the best of our knowledge this is the first attempt to 1) address a smart jamming attack in 
IEEE 802.22 CRNs by malicious SUs and 2) maximize utilization of spectrum opportunities 
while staying in the spectrum band that is being jammed and not hopping away from it. 
4.3 System Model, Attack Model and Assumptions 
4.3.1 System Model 
We consider an IEEE 802.22 Cognitive Radio Network spread across a wide area in which 
collaborative spectrum sensing is undertaken for detection of licensed PU in the region. All of 
the CRN's devices are synchronized for network-wide quiet periods during which they carry out 
the mandatory fast sensing in every super frame. Fast sensing reports from all SUs are 
aggregated at the CRN BS which then decides if some signals are present on the spectrum that 
must be further investigated. If so, the entire CRN carries out fine sensing which may take all of 
the remaining time in current CDT slot. A list of notations and acronyms used in this chapter is 
given in table 4.1. 
Maximum delay allowed for the detection of incumbent PU’s signal and for the CRN to 
vacate current channel is called maximum detection time (MDT). A CDT slot spans 160 msec 
[1] whereas the MDT duration is 2 seconds [5, 9] giving the CRN a maximum of:  
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  ⌊          ⌋        (1) 
discrete time slots to detect the presence of a PU and vacate the spectrum band. IEEE 802.22 
standard mandates conduct of fine sensing in a CDT slot if the result of fast sensing suggests 
presence of some signals that might be from the PU. However under our proposed DS3 
framework, even if the fast sensing stage reports presence of a signal on spectrum, the BS may or 
may not decide to conduct fine sensing in a CDT slot. This adaptive decision is based on a cost 
minimization function and is explained in subsequent section.  
 
Table 4.1: Notations and acronyms – Chapter 4 
Notation Definition 
  time since PU was last detected as active 
   Probability PU is ON after it stays in OFF state for k consecutive CDT slots 
     Probability of CRN carrying out fine sensing 
  Num. of CDT slots in MDT (12 CDT slots as per IEEE 802.22 standard) 
  running time   
     PU's spectrum usage (%) 
  Prob. of PU to transition from state 0 to state 1 
  Prob. of PU to transition from state 1 to state 0 
      Cost of missing PU detection  
   Cost of wasting a spectrum opportunity  
  
  Optimal spectrum sensing decision  
    DS3’s cost minimization function 
  Sensitivity towards PU detection delay 
  Size of the attack history window 
    History window entries 
    Estimate of current attack severity 
CDT Channel Detection Time / 1 superframe (160 msec) 




Figure 4.1: Markov ON/OFF model for PUs Spectrum Usage. 
 
4.3.2 Assumptions 
DS3 framework is meant to be implemented only at the BS which makes it highly scalable 
and is aimed to replace the existing static fine sensing decision criterion of the IEEE 802.22 
standard with a dynamic one. The PU's use of spectrum is modeled as a Markov ON/OFF 
process [21, 23] as shown in figure 4.1 where   is the probability that the PU will transition from 
state 0 to 1 and   is the transition probability from state 1 to 0. State 0 represents OFF/idle and 1 
represents ON/active state of the PU. Fast sensing is assumed to have high false positive under 
large noise or smart jamming attack but has no false negative to miss the detection of any signal 
on the spectrum. Fine sensing may consume a whole CDT slot i.e. 160 msec whereas fast 
sensing lasts only for 9 to 20 micro seconds depending on the technique used [7, 8]. Since fine 
sensing employs sophisticated spectrum sensing techniques and in doing so takes much longer 
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time than fast sensing, it has no false negative i.e., it does not miss the detection of PU if it is 
present on the spectrum.  
 Experimental data recorded in the Chicago city area [22] shows that the TV spectrum is 
severely under-utilized and the long term average spectrum occupancy of the TV spectrum is 
30% while the short term spectrum occupancy is close to 14%. Based on these figures, we can 
conclude the following: 
 Because of low spectrum utilization, the PU can reasonably be assumed to remain 
idle for majority of the time, and 
 Since the spectrum being used opportunistically by CRN belongs to PUs which are 
basically TV broadcast stations, it is reasonable to assume that whether in the OFF or 
the ON state, a PU is expected to remain in that state for a much longer time than 160 
msec, i.e., one super frame time. 
4.3.3 Attack Model 
Malicious users in the CRN do not attack PU's communications and are interested in denying 
spectrum use only to the CRN. They do so by launching a smart jamming attack i.e., transmitting 
a short jamming signal during the fast sensing stage in order to force the CRN to conduct fine 
sensing which in turn means that the CRN cannot avail the spectrum opportunity that arises 
because of PU's absence. This is a smart jamming attack since it denies the use of spectrum to 
the CRN while consuming very little energy as compared with jamming the whole superframe. 
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In addition, the smart jamming attack allows the malicious nodes to utilize rest of the CDT slot 
for their own communications while the CRN is busy conducting fine sensing. 
4.4 DS3: An Adaptive Spectrum Sensing Framework  
In this section we first present the core idea behind our proposed DS3 framework in section 
4.4.1 and the Markov ON/OFF model upon which DS3 is based in section 4.4.2. The details of 
DS3 framework are laid out in section 4.4.3 followed by a discussion on DS3’s adaptive property 
and its handling of various network conditions in section 4.4.4. 
4.4.1 The Core idea for Adaptive Spectrum Sensing 
As explained in the assumptions, the duration of PU being in ON state or OFF state is much 
larger than one superframe duration. Therefore when PU becomes idle, the CRN BS can safely 
assume that it will remain idle for a few more CDT slots and has the option to dynamically 
decide whether or not the CRN needs to conduct fine sensing during subsequent superframes in 
which the fast sensing reports from SUs suggest presence of some signal on the spectrum. The 
original IEEE 802.22 CRN protocol mandates that fine sensing be carried out every time fast 
sensing report aggregation concludes presence of some signal on the spectrum including signals 
of the PU. Such a static method of conducting fine sensing which can consume one or more CDT 
slots would result in wastage of spectrum resources when it is very unlikely that the PU becomes 
active in the very next CDT slot right after becoming idle. Probability of PU becoming active at 
a given CDT slot is one of the components of DS3 framework and is derived in next subsection. 
Therefore the core idea of DS3 is to dynamically determine when to conduct fine sensing in 
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order to save spectrum resource for SUs' usage and at the same time not to delay detection of 
PU's presence on the spectrum for more than the time limit of MDT mandated by the IEEE 
802.22 standard [1, 5, 9]. 
4.4.2 Markov ON/OFF Model for Prediction of PU Activity 
PU's activity on its licensed spectrum bands has often been modeled as Markov ON/OFF 
process [23] and we have also assumed the same model for predicting PU's activity. We are only 
concerned with adaptive spectrum sensing during PU's idle/OFF period i.e., in state 0 since an 
attacker is not assumed to attack PU's communications and wants to deny the use of vacant 
spectrum to SUs in the CRN only. After transitioning to OFF state, let   denote the number of 
CDT slots the PU stays in that state until it jumps back to the ON state, where             
This r.v.   follows a geometric distribution with parameter   which is the probability of PU to 
transition from OFF to ON state. Let    denote our prediction of PU's activity which is the 
probability that given the PU is in the OFF state at time 0, the PU transitions to ON state by time 
interval  , i.e.,     (   ). Thus    is given by the cumulative distribution function of the 
geometric distribution represented as: 
    (   )    (    )
        (2) 
Physically, it means that as time goes on, the PU initially in the OFF state at time     has 
more and more chance to become active again and transition to ON state. Thus equation 2 
represents our prediction of PU's activity in the future and is incorporated in our dynamic fine 
sensing framework's cost minimization function.  
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Figure 4.2: Effect of state transition probability   on     
 
Figure 4.3: Relationship between   and   and the amount of PU's spectrum usage     
In the Markov ON/OFF model, the staying time at each state before transitioning to the other 
state has the memory less characteristic. That is to say, given that at the discrete CDT slot   we 
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know that the PU is in OFF state, the probability that the PU will transition back to ON state at 
interval     will still be equal to   . Based on our assumption a fine sensing carried out at a 
time slot   will tell us whether or not the PU is in OFF state at that time slot. Thus the variable   
in the notation    represents how many discrete time units have passed since the last fine sensing 
which concluded that the PU is OFF. On the other hand, if the last fine sensing concluded that 
the PU is ON, then DS3 will carry out fine sensing statically and continuously for subsequent 
CDT slots according to the original IEEE 802.22 standard. 
From the Markov ON/OFF model, the probability of PU being in state 0 or 1 is represented 
as the steady state probability    and    respectively, where        . It is clear that if we 
define PU spectrum usage as the fraction of time PU utilizes the spectrum under consideration, 
then PU spectrum usage is equal to   . Figure 4.2 shows the impact of   on   . Based on past 
observation data of PU spectrum usage, we can calculate the average amount of time PU stays in 
OFF state, i.e., we know the value of     . Since the geometrically distributed r.v.   is given by 
        , therefore we can calculate the value of   from observed data as: 
               (3) 
Figure 4.3 shows the relationship between the state transition probabilities   and   and the 
amount of PU's spectrum usage   . 
4.4.3 DS3 Framework 
DS3 is based on a cost minimization function that includes cost of interfering with PU's 
communications when PU is active and cost of wasting spectrum opportunities when the PU is 
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idle. However, before discussing details of the cost minimization function we first present how 
the CRN BS estimates attack severity at any given time. We also discuss a parameter called 
sensitivity which represents the BS's aversion towards delaying PU detection. By selecting 
appropriate values for sensitivity, the DS3 framework can be made to behave as the original 
IEEE 802.22 standard.  
4.4.3.1 Estimation of Attack Severity 
Estimation of attack severity at CDT slot   is based on a sliding window that contains a 
record of past   CDT slots' fast sensing reports. The sliding window is meant to ensure that the 
information contained in it represents the recent past only. For every CDT slot, attack severity    
is calculated as: 
   
∑    
 
   
 
⁄                                 (4) 
where     represents the history window entries,       represents the spectrum was reported to 
be vacant and       represents the spectrum was reported to be occupied during fast sensing 
report aggregation at CDT slot  . A fast sensing alert recorded as       in the history window 
could mean the presence of a PU on the spectrum, a jamming attack or noise on the spectrum. 
Whenever fine sensing is carried out after MDT and the PU is not detected as active, then all 
      entries in the hind sight are considered as smart jamming attacks and utilized in 
subsequent CDT slots as estimate of current attack severity   . 
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4.4.3.2 Cost Minimization Function 
DS3 algorithm is based on a cost minimization function with the goal of minimizing the 
overall “costs” associated with dynamic spectrum sensing. There are two possible costs that we 
consider related to our fine sensing decision: 
 The cost of delaying PU’s detection when the PU is actually using the spectrum while 
we choose to skip fine sensing i.e., causing interference to the PU's communications. 
 The cost of wasting spectrum opportunity when PU is in the idle state but DS3 
chooses to carry out fine sensing in response to a fast sensing alert. 
Both of the above scenarios along with smart jamming attack are depicted in figure 5. In the 
first scenario as depicted in figure – 5(b), the cost represents interference caused to the PU when 
the CRN misses detecting PU's activity in the current CDT time slot. In the current IEEE 802.22 
CRN standard, short-term interference is acceptable as long as it is less than the Maximum 
Detection Time (MDT), which is 2 seconds [5, 9]. Meanwhile, the second scenario shown in 
figure – 5(a) and (c), happens when the CRN wastes the CDT slot by conducting fine sensing as 
the fast sensing produces alert, i.e., it encounters either a smart jamming attack or noise on the 
spectrum band, both treated as the same in this chapter. 
Intuitively, an increase in the number of fast sensing alerts due to noise or smart jamming 
attack will result in a corresponding increase in attack severity estimation. This in turn means 
that in response to fast sensing alerts, it is more likely that the CRN will resort to fine sensing 
and spectrum opportunities will be wasted. Therefore, we need a relative increase in the cost of 
spectrum opportunity wastage and to achieve that we incorporate attack severity estimate    in 
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the cost (scenario 2 above). Let the probability of the BS choosing to carry out fine sensing at the 
CDT slot   be represented as   . Equation 5 represents the two costs discussed above 
respectively where   (    ) is the probability of causing interference to the PU and   (  
  ) is the probability of wasting spectrum opportunity. Both of the cost factors include DS3's 
prediction PU's activity which is estimated in equation 2 as well as the current estimate of 
jamming attack severity    given by equation 4. The total cost     associated with dynamically 
deciding whether or not to conduct fine sensing after receiving an alert from fast sensing at time 
  is weighted sum of the two costs given by: 
         (    )        (    )        (5) 
The derivative of equation 5 will represent how the total cost of adaptive spectrum sensing 
changes with the BS's decisions for conducting or skipping fine sensing after receiving fast 
sensing alerts from SUs. It is given as follows: 
   
   
⁄      (    )               (6) 
where     represents the cost factor for missing the detection and causing interference to the PU, 
   represents the cost for carrying out fine sensing under smart jamming attack and thereby 
wasting the current CDT slot,    is the number of CDT slots passed since the last fine sensing 
which concluded that PU is in OFF state and    is the current attack severity estimate. 
The cost of wasting spectrum resource for the CRN should increase linearly with time 
therefore the second cost factor    of equation 5 can be treated as a constant value. However this 
83 
 
is not true for the first cost factor     . It is because potential interference caused to PU's 
spectrum usage should increase significantly when the PU detection delay becomes larger. In 
addition, we should never allow a PU detection time to be longer than the maximum detection 
time (MDT) specified in the standard. For this reason, the cost factor     cannot be a constant 
value. In our proposed DS3 framework we use the following relationship to determine current 
cost factor which forms part of the dynamic fine sensing threshold: 
     {  
 
   ⁄                          
                                     
        (7) 
where   is a parameter representing the “sensitivity” of the BS towards PU detection. The larger 
the value of  , the more sensitive (or aggressive) the BS will be towards fast sensing stage's alert 
reports. Sensitivity is further discussed in next subsection.  
Based on Equations 6 and 7 the optimum value for probability of the BS choosing to carry 
out fine sensing as a result of fast sensing alert from SUs at the CDT slot   is represented as    
  
and is given by: 
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⁄      
        (8) 
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4.4.3.3 Dynamic Fine Sensing Threshold 
The first term on the right hand side of equation 6 i.e.,     (    ) represents DS3's 
dynamic fine sensing threshold. It is dynamic because it contains estimates of both the current 
attack severity as well as PU's activity on the spectrum. If the current estimate of attack severity 
   is high then the dynamic fine sensing threshold will have a higher value. This means that 
under higher jamming attacks, DS3 will be biased towards ignoring the fast sensing alerts. On 
the other hand, if the probability of PU being active on the spectrum    is higher then the 
dynamic fine sensing threshold will have a smaller value. This means that DS3 will be more 
likely to carry out fine sensing as a result of fast sensing alert. The cost factor       is shown in 
figure 5 as the red solid curve while the dynamic fine sensing threshold is shown as the blue 
dotted line. The interaction between DS3 and various channel conditions are shown in figure 4.5. 




4.4.3.4  Sensitivity towards PU Detection Delay 
Figure 4.4 shows how the sensitivity   from equation 7 affects the cost factor      . As the 
sensitivity increases, the cost for not carrying out fine sensing after   consecutive CDT slots 
reaches infinity much faster. In figure 4.4 with      the cost factor reaches infinity for not 
carrying out fine sensing at CDT slot 11 while for      it reaches infinity for not carrying out 
fine sensing at CDT slot 8. Therefore, by increasing the value of sensitivity to a sufficiently large 
value we can make DS3 to function as the original static fine sensing decision algorithm of IEEE 
802.22 standard. Algorithm 1 lists the pseudo-code of the proposed DS3 framework. 
4.4.4 Discussion on DS3's handling of various network conditions 
Our proposed adaptive spectrum sensing framework DS3 has the dual advantage of providing 
security against smart jamming attacks and at the same time making the spectrum utilization 
more efficient than the static algorithm employed by the IEEE 802.22 standard under noisy 
channel conditions. A strong feature of DS3 framework is its adaptability for varying network 
conditions due to its intrinsic optimization approach. By incorporating an estimate of current 
attack severity as well as noise in its objective function, the DS3 framework becomes more 
aware of the spectrum environment. As will be shown in the next section, attack severity 
estimation enables the DS3 framework to significantly reduce the latency in PU detection and 
improved spectrum opportunity utilization. Various network conditions are depicted in figure 
4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 however due to space considerations, MDT is set at 4 CDT slots instead of the 




Figure 4.5: DS3’s handling of Low PU activity on the channel as compared with IEEE 
802.22’s spectrum sensing actions. 
 
4.4.4.1 Low PU Activity 
Figure 4.5 depicts the scenario when the PU is inactive on the spectrum. The upper half of 




sensing was carried out. As the time limit of MDT approaches without carrying out fine sensing, 
cost factor       will approach infinity and will remain at that value. In this case whenever fast 
sensing stage's spectrum report aggregation alerts for the presence of some signal on the 
spectrum, fine sensing will be carried out just like the IEEE 802.22 standard. The details of 
DS3’s approach towards dynamic spectrum sensing under low PU activity are explained as 
follows:  
In the optimization objective function of equation 5, the cost factor     is a parameter that 
changes based on the value of  as calculated in Equation 7.   represents the number of discrete 
CDT slots that have passed since the last fine sensing concluded that the PU is OFF. Therefore, 
if the network is not under smart jamming attack as shown in figure 5a, then fast sensing in each 
CDT time slot will rarely raise an alert when PU is in OFF state. Under such network conditions 
if fast sensing raises an alert, it is very likely that     since it is the number of time slots from 
the current time slot to the previous CDT time slot when fine sensing was conducted. Equation 7 
shows that in this case        and therefore the cost factor       will also become infinity 
which will force DS3's cost minimization function to take the optimal fine sensing decision 
  
    according to Equation 8. This means that on average under normal network conditions 
fine sensing will immediately be carried out as soon as the fast sensing report aggregation at the 
BS suggests presence of some signal on the spectrum. Therefore DS3 framework will not 
introduce extra delay in the detection of PU under normal network conditions and will behave 




Figure 4.6: DS3’s handling of High PU activity on the channel as compared with IEEE 802.22’s 
spectrum sensing actions. 
 
4.4.4.2 High PU Activity 
The scenario when there is high PU activity on the spectrum is shown in figure 4.6. The 
figure shows that although the PU is active and the fast sensing stage gives an alert for presence 




      is below the fine sensing threshold during the first 3 time slots. Notice that the IEEE 
802.22 standard carries out fine sensing during every time slot that the fast sensing stage raises 
an alert.  
This scenario represents the interference caused by DS3 to PU's communications but that 
interference lies within the constraints of MDT set by FCC and DS3 is able to detect PU's 
presence on the spectrum within that time limit. DS3 delays the detection of PU until the cost for 
delaying becomes greater than the fine sensing threshold at which point fine sensing is carried 
out. The cost for delaying PU's detection remains above threshold for PU's communications 
during subsequent time slots which causes the CRN to continue performing fine sensing as a 
result of fast sensing alerts until the PU becomes idle again. The total interference caused to PU's 
communication due to delaying fine sensing can be controlled by selecting appropriate value for 










Figure 4.7: DS3’s handling of smart jamming attack on the channel as compared with IEEE 
802.22’s spectrum sensing actions. 
 
4.4.4.3 Smart Jamming attack and/or Noisy channel 
The scenario when malicious nodes in the CRN launch smart jamming attacks due to 
inactivity from the PU is shown in figure 4.7. Fast sensing stage in every time slot reports 




conditions would be to carry out fine sensing in every CDT slot. On the other hand, DS3 
framework will make the CRN to conduct fine sensing only when the cost factor       for 
ignoring fast sensing reports rises above the dynamic fine sensing threshold while adhering to the 
MDT constraint. This will happen once after observing a number of fast sensing alerts.  
In figure 4.7, fast sensing alerts during every time slot cause the IEEE 802.22 standard to 
carry out fine sensing and results in wastage of all spectrum opportunities due to static fine 
sensing decisions. On the other hand, DS3 ignores alerts from fast sensing during time slots 1 
through 3 because the cost factor       is below the dynamic fine sensing threshold. At time slot 
4, the cost function becomes greater than the threshold and DS3 carries out fine sensing only to 
detect that the alert was not due to PU's signals. This makes DS3's cost function to decrease back 
to its minimum value for subsequent time slots. Although the malicious nodes have launched 
smart jamming attack during every spectrum opportunity, DS3 is able to utilize 75% of them 
whereas the IEEE 802.22 wasted all of them. Simulation results with actual parameters of MDT 
and CDT of section 4.5 show even higher values of spectrum opportunity utilization. Dynamic 
spectrum sensing ensures that the CRN utilizes spectrum opportunities as much as possible and 
will not be frequently interrupted because of noise or smart jamming attacks. Algorithm for DS3 




Table 4.2: Algorithm for DS3 Framework 
Initialization: c ,    ⌊          ⌋, k 0,        running time 
Result: Dynamic spectrum sensing decision 
begin 
1.      time when PU became idle 
2.   for every CDT slot   
3.         if PU state was idle at time     
4.               if fast sensing result is positive then 
5.                     k      
6.                         (   )    (    )
  
7.                     if      then 
8.                                
 
   ⁄  
9.                     else  
10.                                
11.                   end if 
12.                            (    )  (      (    )) 
13.                         ⁄      (    )     (  ) 
14.                   if         ⁄      then 
15.                            
        
16.                   else if       ⁄    then 
17.                                     
      
18.                           else 
19.                                      
    
20.                           end if 
21.                    end if 
22.             else 
23.                    Do not perform fine sensing 
24.             end 
25.      else 
26.             perform fine sensing statically as per IEEE 802.22 standard 
27.                  
28.      end if 
29.  end for 




4.5 Performance Evaluation 
4.5.1 Simulation Setup 
One time slot in simulations which is the same as the protocol's superframe equals 160 
milliseconds and the maximum time available to the CRN for detection of a PU's signal is 2 
seconds or 12 time slots, [1] also called the Maximum Detection Time or MDT, therefore based 
on the current cost function of DS3, the BS may defer fine sensing even when fast sensing 
reports presence of some signal on the spectrum. However with the 802.22 standard, the CRN 
always conducts fine sensing whenever fast sensing gives an alert, and fine sensing always 
consumes the whole CDT slot. The overall fraction of time that the PU is active on the spectrum 
is called PU's Spectrum Usage (%). The absence of PU on the spectrum is called Spectrum 
Opportunity for CRN. A malicious user in the CRN launches a smart DoS attack in spectrum 
opportunity by transmitting a jamming signal during the fast sensing stage of the CDT slot with 
some probability. Every data point shown in figures of this section corresponds to the average of 
100 simulation runs.  
4.5.2 Simulation Results 
Figure 4.8(a) shows a comparison of spectrum opportunity utilization by the IEEE 802.22 
standard and the DS3 framework. Without the adaptive sensing framework DS3, spectrum 
opportunity utilization decreases proportional to the increase in jamming attacks whereas with 
the DS3 framework, the decrease is at a much slower rate and remains close to 90% even when 
the malicious users jam every possible spectrum opportunity. By keeping the delay in PU 
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detection within the limits set by the FCC as well as the 802.22 standard, DS3 enables the CRN 
to achieve one of the fundamental requirements for its operation i.e. non-interference with the 
licensed PU. The results shown in figure 6 were recorded while keeping the sensitivity to its 
minimum value of 10 and PU Spectrum Usage at 30%. Subsequent simulations show how 
varying these parameter affects DS3's performance.  
 
Figure 4.8: DS3’s performance with various parameters (a) Spectrum opportunity utilization (b) 
PU detection delay at varying degrees of jamming attack severity. 
 
Figure 4.8(b) shows how the delay in detection of PU on the spectrum is affected with 
increasing jamming attacks. The delay remains constant at 35% up to a jamming attack severity 
of 50% and increases to approximately 57% which is still within the MDT constraint even when 
every possible spectrum opportunity is jammed. Notice that spectrum opportunity utilization by 





Figure 4.9: DS3’s performance with various parameters (a) Spectrum opportunity utilization (b) 
PU detection delay with varying sensitivity towards PU detection delay. 
 
Figures 4.9(a) and 4.9(b) show the spectrum opportunity utilization and PU detection delay 
of DS3 framework as compared with the IEEE 802.22 standard by varying the sensitivity at a 
fixed jamming attack rate of 70%. Without the benefit of adaptive spectrum sensing, the IEEE 
802.22 standard achieves spectrum opportunity utilization close to 30% whereas it ranges 
between 97% and 91% with the DS3 framework. A lower sensitivity to detect PU's signal means 
that the cost factor has a lower value and the BS is inclined more towards deferring fine sensing 
to a later CDT slot. It is worth mentioning here that by increasing the CRN's sensitivity towards 
the detection of PU's signal, we can achieve comparable PU detection performance with the 
IEEE 802.22 standard as evident from 4.9(b) while at the same time achieving far greater 





Figure 4.10: DS3’s performance with various parameters (a) Spectrum opportunity utilization (b) 
PU detection delay with varying degree of PU’s spectrum usage (%). 
 
A comparison of spectrum opportunity utilization is shown between the IEEE 802.22 
standard and DS3 in figure 4.10(a) with respect to varying PU spectrum usage. It shows that 
PU's spectrum usage has very little impact on spectrum opportunity utilization of the adaptive 
sensing framework. On the other hand the IEEE 802.22 standard is able to utilize only 30% of 
the spectrum opportunities when the attacker jams 70% of the spectrum opportunities. It is 
emphasized here that spectrum opportunity as well as a smart jamming attack is relevant only 
when the PU is idle i.e., during the time slots left over from PU's spectrum usage. Figure 4.10(b) 
demonstrates the effects of PU's spectrum usage on the delay in DS3's detection of its signals. As 
the PU becomes more active on the spectrum, the relative attack severity    on the spectrum 
decreases which in turn makes DS3 to increase the cost of missing PU's detection. Therefore 





In this chapter we presented a novel adaptive spectrum sensing framework called DS3 which 
minimizes the effects of smart jamming as well as noise on the fast sensing phase of DSA and 
improves spectrum utilization through dynamic fine sensing decision. DS3 utilizes the constraint 
of maximum delay in detection of incumbent signal imposed by FCC in its dynamic fine sensing 
decision algorithm and achieves up to 90% improvement in spectrum utilization under smart 
jamming attack while keeping the PU detection delay to within the maximum allowed delay for 
detecting the PU. 
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CHAPTER 5: AN EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORETIC APPROACH 
TOWARDS LONG-TERM SELF COEXISTENCE 
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) made TV white space (TVWS) channels in 
the 54-698 MHz frequency range available [1] for secondary unlicensed access after the TV 
broadcast was switched from analog to digital signal in 2009. Opening up of the TVWS for 
unlicensed use was the result of a realization that the gap between the demand and supply of 
wireless spectrum resource is ever increasing and fixed spectrum allocation is causing its severe 
under-utilization [2]. Strict requirements are however placed on the Secondary Users (SU) of the 
spectrum which is otherwise allocated to licensees called primary users (PU), to continuously 
sense the spectrum and vacate it when the presence of the PU is detected and not to cause them 
any interference. This type of spectrum access is intuitively called Dynamic Spectrum Access 
(DSA). Cognitive Radio Network (CRN) is a paradigm that meets precisely these 
communication requirements and utilizes DSA to enable secondary, unlicensed access to TVWS 
spectrum bands in an opportunistic and non-interfering basis [1]. 
DSA allows CRNs to ensure that their use of spectrum does not cause interference to PUs 
while at the same time all spectrum opportunities are utilized to the maximum. Within a CRN, 
the decision to select a specific channel for DSA is usually made by a central entity such as its 
base station or in case of an ad hoc CRN, an algorithm that enables all SUs to reach a consensus 
for choosing specific channel in a distributed manner. IEEE 802.22 wireless regional area 
network (WRAN) [3] is an example of CRNs in which the base station controls all the operation 
of the CRN including the choice of spectrum bands for communication. Regardless of how a 
decision to select a specific channel is made, every entity within the CRN is bound to abide by 
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that decision. On the other hand, there may be multiple collocated CRNs within a geographical 
region all of which compete for access to the same set of available channels. Sharing of spectrum 
by collocated CRNs is called self coexistence in the context of CRNs which employ coexistence 
protocols such as the IEEE 802.22 standard's Coexistence Beacon Protocol (CBP). However 
without any controlling entity, fair distribution of heterogeneous spectrum resources is non-
trivial in the case of multiple collocated CRNs as they may be independently owned and 
operated by different service providers. This brings us to the definition of the problem statement 
for long term coexistence with heterogeneous spectrum, in the following subsection. 
5.1 Motivation and Contribution 
 Coexistence protocols employed by collocated CRNs work under the assumption that all 
spectrum bands afford the same level of QoS and do not take into consideration the fact that 
these channels can be heterogeneous. The heterogeneity of channels can be in the sense that they 
may vary in their characteristics such as SNR or bandwidth. Similarly, a channel whose PU 
remains idle for most of the time may be more attractive for a CRN as compared with a channel 
whose PU remains mostly active. This would entail that some channels can be considered better 
than others and therefore can have an associated quality parameter. As a result, CRNs are 
expected to have a preference over the set of available channels for secondary access. Without 
any incentive for altruism, all CRNs would want to gain access to the highest quality channels 
resulting in a conflict among rational entities. Therefore, in the absence of any centralized 
enforcement mechanism, evolution of a strategy that would ensure long term coexistence with 
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fair distribution of heterogeneous spectrum resources among collocated CRNs is a challenge and 
is the focus of this chapter. 
Game theory provides an elegant means to model strategic interaction between agents which 
may or may not be cooperative in nature. It has been applied to numerous areas of research 
involving conflict, competition and cooperation in multi-agent systems which also encompass 
wireless communications. Therefore, by leveraging the mechanisms of game theory, we model 
the long term sharing of heterogeneous spectrum by CRNs as an evolutionary anti-coordination 
spectrum sharing game in which collocated CRNs in a given region are its players. The payoff 
for every player in the game is determined by the quality of the spectrum band to which it is able 
to gain access. We present a detailed analysis on the evolutionary stability as well as fairness of 
the solution. For any system with non-cooperative entities, it is likely that there will be some 
associated inefficiency. However, it is worth pointing out that fairness is the primary objective of 
our proposed evolutionary heterogeneous spectrum sharing game. We also confirm our findings 
through detailed simulations. 
We formulate an evolutionary spectrum sharing anti-coordination game and propose its 
solution that is stable even with the presence of greedy strategy, robust under changing network 
conditions and at the same time results in fair distribution of the spectrum resources. 
Specifically, we have made the following contributions:  
 As potential solutions for the heterogeneous spectrum sharing game, we have derived 
the game's pure and mixed strategy Nash Equilibria (PSNE and MSNE respectively).  
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 To show that the game's strategy in MSNE is evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), we 
prove that it cannot be invaded by a greedy strategy and is robust under changing 
network conditions. 
 We have derived replicator dynamics of the proposed evolutionary game, a 
mechanism with which players can learn from their payoff outcomes of strategic 
interactions and modify their strategies at every stage of the game and subsequently 
converge to ESS. 
 Finally, we have presented a fairness analysis of the proposed evolutionary game 
using Jain's fairness index. 
5.2 Related Work 
In this section we provide an overview of some of the works carried out in the domain of self 
coexistence in CRNs as well as application of some of the game theoretic solution concepts in 
the context of communication networks. 
Authors of [5] have applied the evolutionary game theoretic concepts in order to make 
secondary users (SU) of a CRN to participate in collaborative spectrum sensing in a 
decentralized manner. SUs learn through strategic interactions at every stage of the game and the 
learning behavior is modeled with the help of replicator dynamics. A game theoretic approach 
based on correlated equilibrium has been proposed in [6] for multi-tier decentralized interference 
mitigation in two-tier cellular systems. Authors of [7] propose a multi-cell resource allocation 
game for efficient allocation of resources in orthogonal frequency division multiple access 
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(OFDMA) systems based on  throughput, inter-cell interference and complexity. The subcarriers 
are considered as players of the game while the base station acts as the provider of external 
recommendation signal needed for achieving correlation of strategies of players. 
Authors of [8] model the competition among multiple femtocell base stations for spectrum 
resource allocation in an OFDMA LTE downlink system as a static non-cooperative game. The 
correlated equilibrium of the game is derived through a distributed resource block access 
algorithm which is a variant of the No-Regret learning algorithm. CRNs with SUs having 
variable traffic characteristics are considered in [9] to tackle the problem of distributed spectrum 
sensing by modeling it as a cooperative spectrum sensing game for utility maximization. The 
authors have proposed another variant of the no-regret learning algorithm called neighborhood 
learning (NBL) which achieves correlated equilibrium for the spectrum sensing game. In contrast 
to the no-regret learning algorithm, NBL is not completely distributed and requires some 
coordination among players to achieve better performance. 
Correlated equilibrium has been employed in [10] for a P2P file sharing non-cooperative 
game to jointly optimize players’ expected delays in downloading files. Not uploading files for 
others causes an increase in file download time for all players which in turn, forces even the non-
cooperative players to cooperate. The authors of [11] tackle the self-coexistence problem of 
finding a mechanism that achieves a minimum number of wasted time slots for every collocated 
CRN to find an empty spectrum band for communications. To do so, they employ a distributed 
modified minority game under incomplete information assumption. 
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Different punishment strategies have been employed in [12] that form part of a Gaussian 
interference game in a one-shot game as well as an infinite horizon repeated game to enforce 
cooperation. Spectrum sharing is however considered within the context of a single CRN. 
Evolutionary game theory is applied in [13] to solve the problem in a joint context of spectrum 
sensing and sharing within a single CRN. Multiple SUs are assumed to be competing for 
unlicensed access to a single channel. SUs are considered to have half-duplex devices so they 
cannot sense and access a channel simultaneously. Correlated equilibrium has been proposed in 
[14] as a solution for efficient coexistence by collocated CRNs with heterogeneous channels. 
Utility graph coloring is used to address the problem of self-coexistence in CRNs in [15]. 
Allocation of spectrum for multiple overlapping CRNs is done using graph coloring in order to 
minimize interference and maximize spectrum utilization using a combination of aggregation, 
fragmentation of channel carriers, broadcast messages and contention resolution. The authors of 
[16] achieve correlated equilibrium with the help of No-regret learning algorithm to address the 
problem of network congestion when a number of SUs within a single CRN contend for access 
to channels using a CSMA type MAC protocol. They model interactions of SUs within the CRN 
as a prisoner’s dilemma game in which payoffs for the players are based on aggressive or non-






Figure 5.1: (a) Collocated CRNs competing for (b) Heterogeneous channels. The channels of the 
spectrum band may vary in quality with respect to availability, bandwidth or SNR, etc. 
 
5.3 System Model and Assumptions 
5.3.1 System Model 
As shown in figure 5.1, we consider a region where overlapping CRNs co-exist and compete 
with each other for secondary access to the licensed spectrum bands. We model the entire TVWS 
spectrum band that is available for unlicensed use by CRNs as a set of             channels. 
The spectrum band is heterogeneous by virtue of the ‘quality’ of a channel which is determined 
by the probability    with which PUs access their licensed channels. Since knowledge of PU's 
spectrum allocation/activity is mandated by the FCC for CRNs [1][3], is publically available 
through online databases [17][18] and also sensed by CRNs at regular intervals, players can 
calculate current values of    based on past observations. Higher    for a given channel   means 
it is of a lower quality and vice versa and CRNs compete to access the best quality channels. 
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Gaining access to higher quality channel results in higher payoff    while lower quality channel 
yields lower payoff for CRNs where payoff         from gaining access to channel  .  
CRNs need to gain access to a channel in every time slot also called a Channel Detection 
Time (CDT) slot [3]. Players are assumed to be rational and non-cooperative i.e., they do not 
share a common goal and therefore do not cooperate with each other. It is in every CRN's 
interest to gain access to the channels with minimum PU activity i.e., minimum value of   . 
When two or more CRNs select the same channel for access in a given time slot, a 
contention/collision situation arises and that particular time slot's spectrum opportunity is 
wasted. Having payoffs for selecting a specific channel derived from common knowledge such 
as    is an intuitive choice and makes distributed implementation of our proposed framework 
possible. It is worth mentioning that any positive value for payoff derived from any other 
parameter e.g., QoS or bandwidth can be used instead of    without affecting our analysis and 
the outcomes. As demonstrated subsequently, the number of collocated CRNs does not play any 
part in the game model because an evolutionary game is concerned with the evolution of 
strategies, associated payoffs and their stability.  
5.3.2 Assumptions 
 Following are the underlying assumptions for the work presented in this chapter: 
 Time: A single MAC superframe constitutes one time slot. Every CRN needs to gain 




 Spectrum opportunity and wastage: A given time slot's spectrum opportunity arises 
due to the absence of its PU may result in a collision and therefore be wasted if two or 
more CRNs select the same channel for access. 
 Knowledge about PU activity: In addition to the FCC mandated continuous spectrum 
sensing to detect PUs' activity, CRNs are also required to periodically access online 
databases such as [17][18] in order to gain up-to-date information about licensed PUs 
operating in a given region. 
 Channel quality: The amount of PU activity, bandwidth and SNR which collectively 
determine a channel's quality can be learnt from online databases and measured 
through spectrum sensing over a period of time. Due to the fact that all contending 
CRNs are collocated in a given region, it is reasonable to assume that a given 
channel's quality is common knowledge. 
 Non-cooperative behavior: All CRNs are independent as they do not share a common 
goal and therefore do not cooperate with each other. Being rational about their 
choices, every player has a clear preference of selecting the best available channel 
before the start of every time slot. Consequently, if every player tries to access the 
best channel, it will result in a collision and the spectrum opportunity being wasted. 
 Payoffs2: Players3 that eventually gain access to higher quality channels will gain 
higher payoffs as compared to the players that end up with lower quality channels. In 
subsequent section, we show that our proposed spectrum sharing game can be 
implemented solely on the basis of a CRN's common knowledge payoff observations. 
                                                 
2
 We use the terms utility and payoff interchangeably. 
3
 Similarly, we use the terms CRNs and players interchangeably. 
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Table 5.1: Notations and acronyms – Chapter 5 
Notation Definition 
  set of available channels 
  set of available actions (of selecting specific channels) 
   CRN’s action of selecting channel   
  set of channels’ utilities 
   CRN’s utility for gaining access to channel   
   
  best actions/strategies played by players other than player   
  
  action/strategy of player   which is the best response (PSNE) to    
  
 ̂ prob. distribution over set of channels in MSNE – The incumbent strategy 
   prob. distribution greedier than MSNE – The mutant strategy 
      Expected Utility from accessing channel   
   Initial fitness of every CRN 
  Total average payoff of the entire CRN population  
  
  probability of selecting a channel for next time slot 
ESS Evolutionarily Stable Strategy 
PU Primary User 
SU Secondary User 
NE Nash Equilibrium 
PSNE Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium 
MSNE Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium 




5.4 Evolutionary Anti-Coordination Spectrum Sharing Game 
In this section, we first present the basics of evolutionary game theory followed by 
formulation of our proposed evolutionary spectrum sharing game. Next, we derive solutions for 
the game for a 2-channel scenario and extend it for a  -channel scenario with replicator 
dynamics.  
5.4.1 Evolutionary Game Theory: Basics 
Evolutionary game theory formalizes the way in which various strategies of a population mix 
interact while competing against each other. As a result of such competitions, relative fitness of 
strategies can be determined based upon the payoffs that the strategies bring. An incumbent 
strategy of a population may be invaded by a mutant strategy if, on average, the mutant strategy 
can bring higher payoffs than the incumbent strategy. A strategy that cannot be invaded by a 
mutant strategy is said to be an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. We consider the action of 
selecting a specific channel as a CRN's strategy and need to determine which strategies are fair 
and stable for the long term. To that end, we derive the PSNE and MSNE as the game's solutions 
and prove that MSNE is ESS i.e., MSNE cannot be invaded by a mutant strategy that is greedier 
than MSNE. In addition to being evolutionarily stable, MSNE of the game is also fair because of 
its definition, which is presented subsequently. 
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5.4.2 Game Formulation 
The heterogeneous spectrum sharing anti-coordination game presented here is a non-
cooperative repeated game with perfect information because: 
 Being rational players, CRNs compete for the best channels available in the spectrum 
band and are interested only in maximizing their own utility. Therefore, CRNs are not 
bound to cooperate with each other.  
 Utilities are common knowledge since the quality of various network parameters can 
be measured by every CRN. Also, every CRN can tell which channels other CRNs 
were able to gain access to in the past hence they know other CRNs' payoffs. 
The evolutionary heterogeneous spectrum sharing game is represented 
as    ⟨( )  ( ) ( )⟩ where            denotes the set of available channels. Every player 
in the game has the same action space represented by               and there is a bijection 
between the sets   and . The set of utilities of the channels is represented as 
             . Strategy    means selecting channel   for communication and a player gets 
a payoff of   if it selected channel   and no other player selected the same channel for a given 
time slot. The payoff for players playing strategies    and    when competing against each other 
is denoted by the ordered pair  (     )    and is a function of an individual channel's quality 
given by: 
 (     )  {
(     )                       




Table 5.2: Strategic form representation of a 2-channel evolutionary game 
       
   (0,0) (   ,   ) 
   (  ,   ) (0,0) 
 
where the first element of the ordered pair   (     ) represents the payoff for player that 
selected channel   and the second element for player that selected channel  . For the sake of 
clarity and ease in analysis and without any loss of generality, we assume that           
   
 . Also, we initially consider a 2-channel game i.e., a game with 2 heterogeneous channels 
and derive its PSNE and MSNE as potential solutions. Later, we consider the  -channel scenario 
where      , in section 5.4.5 and derive the Replicator Dynamics of the proposed evolutionary 
game. Replicator dynamic is a mechanism with which players can learn from their payoff 
outcomes of strategic interactions and modify their strategies at every stage of the game to 
converge to ESS.  
The game represented by equation (1) can also be represented in strategic form as table 5.2 
which shows the payoffs for two players selecting channels   or  . Since       , it is in every 
CRN's interest to choose channel   instead of channel   for a larger payoff. However, when the 
players select the same channel it results in a collision, the spectrum opportunity being wasted 
and both player end up with a payoff of 0. On the other hand, if both players select different 
channels then their payoffs reflect the quality of the channel to which they are able to gain 
access, hence the name anti-coordination game. As shown in table 5.2, this game is the reverse 
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of the classic Battle of the Sexes game and is classified as an anti-coordination game where it is 
in both players' interest not to end up selecting the same strategy. 
5.4.3 Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria 
In this subsection we first derive the PSNE followed by MSNE, which are the two potential 
solutions that are considered for our evolutionary spectrum sharing anti-coordination game. 
Definition 1: The Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium [19][22] of the spectrum sharing game is 
an action profile      of actions, such that: 
 (   
      
 )   (        
 )              (2) 
where   is a preference relation over payoffs of strategies    
  and    . The above definition 
means that for    
  to be a pure strategy NE, it must satisfy the condition that no player   has 
another strategy that yields a higher payoff than the one for playing    
  given that every other 
player plays their equilibrium strategy     
 . 
Lemma 1: Strategy pairs (     ) and (     ) are pure strategy NE of the anti-coordination 
game. 
Proof: Assume player 1 to be the row player and player 2 to be the column player in table 
6.2. From equation 1 it follows that both    and    are positive values and therefore the payoffs 
for strategy pairs (     ) and (     ) are greater than the payoffs for strategy pairs (     )  and 
(     ). Consider the payoff for strategy pair (     ) from table 6.2. Given that the player 
playing strategy    continues to play this strategy, then from definition 1 for NE, it follows that 
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the player playing strategy    does not have any incentive to change his choice to    i.e., it will 
receive a smaller payoff of 0 if it switched to   . Therefore, (     ) is a PSNE. The same 
argument can be applied to prove that the strategy pair (     ) is the second PSNE of this game. ■ 
Definition 2: The Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium [19][22] of the spectrum sharing game is 
a probability distribution  ̂ over the set of actions    for any player such that: 
 ̂                  
         ∑   
 
      (3) 
which makes the opponents indifferent about the choice of their strategies by making the payoffs 
from all of their strategies equal. Let   be the probability with which player 1 plays strategy    
and   (   ) be the probability of playing strategy   , then from the payoffs of table 6.2, the 
expected utility of player 2 for playing strategy    is given by: 
   (  )     (     )    (     )   ( )   (  ) (4) 
Similarly, the expected utility of player 2 for playing strategy    is given by: 
   (  )     (     )    (     )   (  )   ( ) (5) 
According to definition 2, player 2 will be indifferent about the choice of strategies when the 
expected utilities from playing strategies    and    are equal, i.e., 
   (  )     (  ) (6) 
Substituting equations 4 and 5 in equation 6, we have 
        . Therefore: 
  
  




       
  
     
 (8) 
The mixed strategy NE for the heterogeneous spectrum sharing game is given by the 
distribution  ̂        of equations 7 and 8 and shown in table 5.3 which means that when both 
players select strategies    and    with probabilities   and   respectively, then their opponents 
will be indifferent about the outcomes of the play. This means that all CRNs in a given region 
form a polymorphic population in which every CRN mixes for its choice of available channels 
according to the probability distribution  ̂ which is the MSNE for our evolutionary channel 
sharing game. The probability distribution  ̂ also represents the proportions of the population 
adopting different strategies at any given stage of the game. To generalize, expected utility for 
every player in a  -channel heterogeneous spectrum sharing game is given as follows: 
    ∑     
 
         (9) 
where    represents the probability of a CRN selecting channel   all other CRNs not selecting 
channel . 
 
Table 5.3: MSNE of a 2-channel evolutionary spectrum sharing game 
 ̂ Prob.(    ) Prob.(    ) 
Prob.(    ) (0,0) (   ,   ) 
Prob.(    ) (  ,   ) (0,0) 
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5.4.4 Evolutionary Stability of the Game's Equilibria 
To determine if the game's solutions derived in preceding subsection can be invaded by a 
mutant strategy that is greedier; we analyze its evolutionary stability with the help of definition 3 
as follows: 
Definition 3: For a strategy \hat{p} to be ESS, it must satisfy the following conditions [20]: 
1.     ( ̂  ̂)   (    ̂)     
2.        ( ̂  ̂)   (    ̂)          ( ̂   )   (     ) 
where  ̂ is the strategy played by the population and can therefore be termed as the population's 
incumbent strategy while    is a mutant strategy that competes with the incumbent strategy. 
According to the first condition of definition 3, an incumbent strategy (1) must be a symmetric 
NE and (2) must perform at least as good against itself as it does against a mutant strategy. 
According to the second condition of definition 3, if an incumbent strategy is not a strict NE then 
the incumbent strategy must do strictly better against a mutant than a mutant strategy does 
against itself. Now we analyze both PSNE and MSNE derived in preceding subsection according 
to definition 3 to see if they are evolutionarily stable. 
5.4.4.1 Evolutionary Stability of PSNE 
 Earlier we proved that the strategies (     ) and (     ) are the PSNE of our evolutionary 
game. If two players play the same strategy i.e., play ( ̂  ̂) and are in equilibrium, then it is said 
to be a symmetric NE. Clearly, the PSNE of our game are not symmetric NE and by condition 
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(1) of definition 3,  ( ̂  ̂)   (    ̂). Therefore, pure strategy NE is not evolutionarily stable 
according to definition 3. Another aspect of the PSNE is that it is always unfair for the player 
that selected the lower quality channel therefore making it impractical as a long term strategy for 
CRNs' channel selection. 
5.4.4.2 Evolutionary Stability of MSNE 
 With no pure strategy NE for our evolutionary game as ESS, we now determine if the 
MSNE that we derived in equations (7) and (8) is an ESS according to definition 3. To do so, we 
first calculate  ( ̂  ̂) i.e., see how the incumbent strategy  ̂ fares against itself and then 
determine the payoff of a mutant strategy    against the incumbent strategy. Consider the payoff 
matrix of table 5.3 where the players select strategies   and    with the probability distribution 
of the incumbent strategy  ̂        then: 
 ( ̂  ̂)    (     ) (10) 
In equation (10) above, we have determined the payoff of incumbent strategy  ̂ when it 
competes against itself i.e.,  ( ̂  ̂). Now consider a mutant strategy               which 
is greedier than the incumbent strategy  ̂ and assume that it selects the higher quality channel   
with a higher probability i.e.,     and selects the lower quality channel   with lower 
probability i.e.,    , where   is a small positive number that represents the increase in 
greediness/probability of a mutant strategy to select a higher quality channel. Because of the 
existence of two competing strategies, we now calculate  (    ̂) i.e., the utility of the mutant 
strategy against the incumbent strategy: 
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 (    ̂)    (     )   (       ) (11) 
Since       as assumed in section 5.3, we know that     is greater than     and therefore 
the second term of equation (11) is positive. From equations (10) and (11) we have  ( ̂  ̂)  
 (    ̂). Since  ( ̂  ̂) is strictly greater than  (    ̂), we do not need to check for the second 
condition of definition 3 and we conclude that the incumbent strategy  ̂ does strictly better than 
the mutation   , which will die out in the evolutionary game. Hence our MSNE cannot be 
invaded by the greedier mutation    and is therefore an ESS. 
It is pointed out that derivation of MSNE becomes intractable when the number of channels 
is greater than 2. To expand our analysis for a  -channel scenario, we now introduce the concept 
of replicator dynamics in the following subsection. 
5.4.5 Replicator Dynamics and K-Channel Scenario 
In the above section, we have shown that the mixed strategy NE of our proposed 
evolutionary game framework is evolutionarily stable. Evolutionary stability has provided us 
with a means to evaluate how the channel selection strategies perform in the long run when the 
CRNs do not cooperate with each other. This concept is somewhat static in nature because it 
does not demonstrate the dynamics with which the strategies evolve and converge to an 
equilibrium state. Replicator Dynamics explain how players evolve their behaviors by learning 
through strategic interactions at every stage/generation of the game to reach the equilibrium state 
which is also evolutionarily stable. In order to show the dynamics and to extend our analysis to 
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the  -channel scenario, we now derive the Replicator Dynamics of our evolutionary 
heterogeneous spectrum sharing game. 
Following our analysis from the previous section, let   ̂              and   ∑   
 
      
where  ̂ represents the strategy of selecting channel   with probability   . Alternatively, we can 
also think of    as the proportion of population that select channel   at any given time. 
Furthermore, let    be the initial fitness of every CRN and the average payoff of CRNs selecting 
channel   at a given stage of the game be represented by the set             . Then payoff 
for a CRN selecting channel   can be calculated as: 
      ∑     (     )
 
    (12) 
where  (     ) is the fitness of a CRN that selects channel   in a pairwise competition against a 
CRN that selects channel  . Let   be the total average payoff of the entire CRN population at any 
given time. Then   is given by: 
  ∑      
 
          (13) 
and the probability    
  of a CRN selecting channel    for the next stage/time slot of the game is 
given by: 
  
      
   (    )
 
 (14) 
Equations (12) to (14) are the replicator dynamics of our evolutionary spectrum sharing 
game. The idea behind the replicator dynamics is that if selecting channel   in the current time 
slot results in a higher average fitness for the CRNs that selected it than the overall fitness of the 
entire CRN population, then the proportion of CRNs selecting channel   in the next time slot 
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will increase. CRNs are able to calculate the total average payoff for the entire CRN population 
  of equation (13) because it is based on common knowledge parameters:    is the proportion of 
population that selected channel   while channel quality represented by    is also known to 
every CRN. In general, if selecting a particular channel in a given time slot results in a higher 
than total average payoff then that channel will be selected more frequently in subsequent time 
slots, ultimately converging to ESS. 
 
Table 5.4: Replicator Dynamics Algorithm 
Data:   , set of available channels   and their utilities   
Result: Channel selection strategies converge to ESS. 
Initialization: initial fitness of CRNs   , population distribution   , channel utilities    
for every stage/time step of the game do 
1.           With current channel utilities, compute average payoff    for the proportion of 
CRN population that selected channel   at current time – equation (12); 
2.           Compute total average payoff   for the entire CRN population at current time – 
equation (13); 






5.5 Fairness Analysis of Derived Equilibria 
We now provide an analysis on the fairness of the Nash equilibria derived in preceding 
section. For the sake of clarity and ease of understanding, we consider the case of a 2-channel 
heterogeneous spectrum sharing game while the same arguments can be applied for analyzing a 
 -channel scenario. The Nash equilibria being considered as solutions for the spectrum sharing 
heterogeneous game are: 
 Two pure-strategy NE for the anti-coordination game are (     ) and (     ). 
 A mixed strategy NE defined by the probability distribution  ̂        given by 
equations (7) and (8). 
One of the ways to determine if entities receive a fair share of the system's resources is with 
Jains fairness index [21]. If there are   CRNs and every CRN's utility is given as    then fairness 
of the derived Nash equlibria can measured by Jain's equation as: 
 (          )  
(∑    
 
   )
 
  ∑    
  
   
 (15) 
As assumed previously in section 5.3.1 for a 2-channel scenario, channel   is of higher 
quality than channel   therefore      . Then from the payoff matrix of table 5.2, gaining 
access to channel   brings a larger payoff to a CRN whereas being of comparatively lower 
quality, channel   brings a smaller payoff. There are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria 
(     ) and (     ), however intuitively, both of them are unfair because       and one 
player always gets a smaller payoff than the other. This can be confirmed with equation (15) as 
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follows: whenever all    are equal then the ratio 
(∑    
 
   )
 
  ∑    
  
   
 in equation (15) yields a value equal to 
  and Jain's index would be equal to 1 i.e., the maximum, while for an unequal distribution of 
payoffs it would be smaller than 1. Since PSNE does not result in equal payoff for all CRNs, it is 
not a fair solution. 
Let us now consider fairness of MSNE. According to definition 2, MSNE is a probability 
distribution over the set of strategies which makes the players indifferent about their choice of 
strategies by making the payoffs equal even though the channels are of different quality. When 
all the payoffs    become equal then from the same argument of the preceding paragraph, 
equation (15) yields an index equal to 1 resulting in the MSNE's resource distribution to be fair.  
5.6 Simulations and Results 
5.6.1 Preliminaries 
We have conducted simulations to study the effects of applying evolutionary game theoretic 
model for self-coexistence with heterogeneous channels and to study how the channel selection 
strategies in mixed strategy Nash Equilibria are also the evolutionarily stable states. We first 
show the results of simulations in which the collocated CRNs have only two available channels 
for which they contend and converge to an evolutionary stable state. Later, we show that our 
evolutionary game converges to ESS when there are more than 2 channels available for 
contention. To that end, we have implemented the Replicator dynamics and provide results of 
our experiments with 3, 4 and 5 heterogeneous channels as well. We also show that the 
evolutionary game can converge to new ESS when the network conditions may be changing 
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requiring that the CRNs adjust to the new environments. As described in section 5.3,    means 
the action of selecting channel  . 
Figure 5.2: Channel access probabilities and average payoffs when the number of channels 
available for contention is    . (a) Channel access probability and (b) average payoffs when 
the initial probabilities are unequal, figures (c) and (d) show the results when initial probabilities 
are equal, (e) and (f) results under changing network conditions i.e., quality of channel 1 
becomes worse than channel 2 at time     . 
 
5.6.2 Results 
Figure 5.2 represents the scenario in which CRNs contend for 2 channels for secondary 
access. Figure 5.2(a) shows how CRNs select one out of two available channels with some 
probability where channel 1 is of better quality than channel 2. Any positive values for channel 
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utilities would work however in case of simulations of figure 5.2 are assumed to be      and 
     for channels 1 and 2 respectively and its MSNE is                    . Payoff 
from such strategic interactions is shown in figure 5.2(b) based on which, CRNs modify the 
probabilities of selecting the same channels in subsequent time slots/stages. 
Let us first consider payoffs of CRNs that select channels with smaller payoffs. As shown in 
figure 5.2(b), CRNs that select the lower quality channel receive a larger average payoff at     
than CRNs that select higher quality channel. This happens because more CRNs would want to 
gain access to higher quality channel resulting in collisions and a zero payoff. Receiving higher 
payoff makes the CRNs that selected smaller payoff channels to further increase the probability 
of selecting the lower quality channel at     (figure 5.2(a)). This however, results in lower 
average payoff for them at      than at    . This happens because the higher quality 
channels are accessed with a relatively smaller probability at     because in previous time slot, 
it had resulted in smaller payoff. A relatively smaller payoff at     compared with higher 
payoff at     from accessing channel 2 is still greater than the total average payoff of the entire 
CRN which results in an even greater probability of selecting lower quality channel in 
subsequent stages. A similar yet opposite pattern can be seen for CRNs that select higher quality 
channels with higher probabilities. Stated in another way, the proportion of CRNs selecting a 
particular channel increases if its payoff is bigger than total average payoff of the entire 
population and vice versa.  
CRNs keep modifying their channel selection probabilities in the same manner until their 
payoffs converge and they reach the ESS, which in the case of figure 5.2(a) is              
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       at around     . The amount of time taken to converge to ESS is important as it would 
determine spectrum wastage because of collisions and is demonstrated in subsequent 
simulations. The average payoff    of selecting a given channel   is calculated by having the 
initial payoff    of equation (12) equal to 1. Figures 5.2(c) and 5.2(d) represent the case when 
initial channel selection probabilities are equal yet they still converge to ESS. Figures 5.2€ and 
5.2(f) represent changing network conditions i.e., quality of channel 1 becomes worse than 





Figure 5.3: (a) Total payoff for both channels becomes equal when initial probability of selecting 
channel 1 equals           i.e., the ESS probability. (b)  Channel access probability and (c) 
average payoffs when the initial probabilities are equal for a 3-channel scenario.  
 
Figure 5.3(a) shows that the total payoff for both channels becomes equal when initial 
probability of selecting channel 1 equals           and the probability of selecting channel 2 
equals           which is the game's ESS. It also shows that ESS is the only point where 
CRNs can have a fair distribution of spectrum resources. Figures 5.3(b), 5.3(c), 5.4 and 5.5 show 
the convergence of channel selection probabilities to ESS along with their respective average 
payoffs in cases where the number of channels is increased to 3, 4 and 5 respectively and channel 
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utilities are varied between values such as 9 and 4. It is however pointed out that any values of 
channel utilities can be used without affecting our analyses. The initial channel selection 
probabilities may be equal or unequal, yet in any case the game always converges to the ESS for 
any given set of channel utilities. Another important observation is that the convergence rate to 
ESS decreases with the increase in number of channels and how accurate the initial probabilities 
are as compared to the ESS.  
 
Figure 5.4: (a), (c) and (e) Channel access probabilities and (b), (d) and (f) average payoffs. For 
(a) and (b) the number of channels available for contention is 3 i.e.,     and initial 
probabilities are un-equal. For (c) and (d) the number of channels available for contention is 4 
i.e.,     and initial probabilities are equal whereas for (e) and (f)     and initial 





Figure 5.5: (a) and (c) Channel access probabilities and (b) and (d) average payoffs when the 
number of channels available for contention is 5 i.e.,    . For (a) and (b) initial probabilities 
are equal. For (c) and (d) the initial probabilities are un-equal. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
Coexistence protocols employed by CRNs do not take into consideration the fact that 
spectrum bands vary significantly with regards to channel quality thereby making some channels 
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of the spectrum bands more attractive to CRNs than others. This work aimed at answering the 
fundamental question of how CRNs should share heterogeneous spectrum bands in a distributed 
yet fair manner and proposed an evolutionary game theoretic framework to achieve that. We 
derived equilibrium strategies for CRNs’ spectrum sharing game for selecting particular 
spectrum bands and proved that the mixed strategy Nash Equilibria derived in the process are 
evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) while also being fair. We also derived the mechanism of 
Replicator Dynamics with which players learn from payoff outcomes of their strategic 
interactions and modify their strategies at every stage of the evolutionary game. Since all players 
approach the ESS based solely upon the common knowledge payoff observations, our proposed 
evolutionary framework can be implemented in a distributed manner. 
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CHAPTER 6: COEXISTENCE IN HETEROGENEOUS SPECTRUM 
THROUGH DISTRIBUTED CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM 
TV white space (TVWS) channels in the 54-698 MHz frequency range have been made 
available by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) [1] for secondary unlicensed 
access. This is because of a realization that the gap between the demand and supply of wireless 
spectrum resource is ever increasing and fixed spectrum allocation is causing its severe under-
utilization [2]. Strict requirements are placed on the Secondary Users (SU) of the spectrum 
which is otherwise allocated to licensees called primary users (PU), to continuously sense the 
spectrum and vacate it when the presence of the PU is detected and not to cause them any 
interference. This type of spectrum access is intuitively called Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA). 
Cognitive Radio Network (CRN) is a paradigm that meets precisely this communication criterion 
and utilizes DSA to enable secondary, unlicensed access to TVWS spectrum bands in an 
opportunistic and non-interfering basis [1].  
DSA allows CRNs to ensure that their use of spectrum does not cause interference to PUs 
while at the same time all spectrum opportunities are utilized to the maximum. The decision to 
select a specific channel for DSA is usually made by a central entity in the CRN such as its base 
station or some algorithm that enables all SUs in the CRN to reach a consensus in a distributed 
manner. IEEE 802.22 wireless regional area network (WRANs) [3] is an example of a CRN in 
which the base station controls all the operation including the choice of spectrum bands for 
communication. Regardless of how a decision to utilize a specific channel is made, every entity 
in the CRN is bound to abide by that decision. However, reaching a consensus is non-trivial in 
the case of multiple collocated CRNs in a given region, all of whom compete for access to the 
133 
 
same set of available channels. This situation is called self co-existence in the context of CRNs 
which employ coexistence protocols to deal with such situations.  
6.1 Motivation and Contribution 
Most coexistence protocols work under the assumption that all spectrum bands afford the 
same level of throughput and do not take into consideration the fact that these channels can be 
heterogeneous. The heterogeneity of channels can be in the sense that they may vary in their 
characteristics such as signal to noise ratio (SNR) or bandwidth. Furthermore, a channel whose 
PU remains idle for most of the time may be more attractive to a CRN as compared with a 
channel with high PU spectrum usage. This would entail that channels can have an associated 
quality parameter and CRNs may have a preference over the set of available channels for 
secondary access. Without any incentive for altruism, all CRNs would want to gain access to the 
highest quality channels making it a conflict condition. Therefore, in the absence of any 
mechanism to enforce fairness in accessing varying quality channels, ensuring coexistence with 
minimal contention and efficient spectrum utilization for CRNs is likely to become a very 
difficult task.  
Game theory provides an elegant means to model strategic interaction between agents which 
may or may not be cooperative in nature. It has been applied to numerous areas of research 
involving conflict, competition and cooperation in multi-agent systems which also encompass 
wireless communications. Therefore, by leveraging the mechanisms of game theory, we model 
the heterogeneous spectrum sharing in CRNs as a repeated, non-cooperative anti-coordination 
game in which collocated CRNs in a given region are its players. The payoff for every player in 
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the game is determined by the quality of the spectrum band to which it is able to gain access. We 
present a detailed mathematical analysis on fairness and efficiency of the solution through the 
concept of Price of Anarchy which is an analysis tool that measures a system's degradation in the 
presence of selfish behavior from its entities. We also confirm our findings through detailed 
simulations.  
We formulate a heterogeneous spectrum sharing anti-coordination game to come up with a 
solution that results in fair and efficient utilization of the spectrum resources. Specifically, 
following contributions are made:  
 As potential solutions for the heterogeneous spectrum sharing game, we have derived 
the game's pure and mixed strategy Nash Equilibria (PSNE and MSNE respectively) 
as well as its Correlated equilibrium (CE).  
 We have analyzed the game's solutions in the context of fairness and efficiency and 
demonstrated that the traditional solution concepts of Nash Equilibria (NE) are either 
inefficient or unfair. We also show that the strategies in CE are optimal as well as fair 
while sharing heterogeneous spectrum resource.  
 Finally, to show that CE is scalable, we have demonstrated how CE can be achieved 
in a 2-player as well as an N-player game with centralized as well as a distributed 




6.2 Related Work 
In this section we provide an overview of some of the works carried out in the domain of self 
coexistence in CRNs as well as application of the game theoretic solution concept of correlated 
equilibrium in the context of communication networks. 
A game theoretic approach based on correlated equilibrium has been proposed in [4] for 
multi-tier decentralized interference mitigation in two-tier cellular systems. Authors of [5] 
propose a multi-cell resource allocation game for efficient allocation of resources in orthogonal 
frequency division multiple access (OFDMA) systems based on  throughput, inter-cell 
interference and complexity. The subcarriers are considered as players of the game while the 
base station acts as the provider of external recommendation signal needed for achieving 
correlation of strategies of players. 
Authors of [6] model the competition among multiple femtocell base stations for spectrum 
resource allocation in an OFDMA LTE downlink system as a static non-cooperative game. The 
correlated equilibrium of the game is derived through a distributed resource block access 
algorithm which is a variant of the No-Regret learning algorithm. CRNs with SUs having 
variable traffic characteristics are considered in [7] to tackle the problem of distributed spectrum 
sensing by modeling it as a cooperative spectrum sensing game for utility maximization. The 
authors have proposed another variant of the no-regret learning algorithm called neighborhood 
learning (NBL) which achieves correlated equilibrium for the spectrum sensing game. In contrast 
to the no-regret learning algorithm, NBL is not completely distributed and requires some 
coordination among players to achieve better performance. 
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Correlated equilibrium has been employed in [8] for a P2P file sharing non-cooperative game 
to jointly optimize players’ expected delays in downloading files. Not uploading files for others 
causes an increase in file download time for all players which in turn, forces even the non-
cooperative players to cooperate. The authors of [9] tackle the self-coexistence problem of 
finding a mechanism that achieves a minimum number of wasted time slots for every collocated 
CRN to find an empty spectrum band for communications. To do so, they employ a distributed 
modified minority game under incomplete information assumption. 
Different punishment strategies have been employed in [10] that form part of a Gaussian 
interference game in a one-shot game as well as an infinite horizon repeated game to enforce 
cooperation. Spectrum sharing is however considered within the context of a single CRN. 
Evolutionary game theory is applied in [11]to solve the problem in a joint context of spectrum 
sensing and sharing within a single CRN. Multiple SUs are assumed to be competing for 
unlicensed access to a single channel. SUs are considered to have half-duplex devices so they 
cannot sense and access a channel simultaneously. 
Utility graph coloring is used to address the problem of self-coexistence in CRNs in 
[12]Allocation of spectrum for multiple overlapping CRNs is done using graph coloring in order 
to minimize interference and maximize spectrum utilization using a combination of aggregation, 
fragmentation of channel carriers, broadcast messages and contention resolution. The authors of 
[14]achieve correlated equilibrium with the help of No-regret learning algorithm to address the 
problem of network congestion when a number of SUs within a single CRN contend for access 
to channels using a CSMA type MAC protocol. They model interactions of SUs within the CRN 
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as a prisoner’s dilemma game in which payoffs for the players are based on aggressive or non-
aggressive transmission strategies after gaining access to idle channels. 
Figure 6.1:Collocated CRNs competing for Heterogeneous channels. 
 
6.3 System Model and Assumptions 
6.3.1 System Model 
As shown in figure 6.1, we consider a region where IEEE 802.22 WRAN based CRNs 
represented by the set of             players are collocated and contend for secondary 
access to the licensed spectrum bands. The set of TVWS channels available for secondary access 
by the contending CRNs is represented as             channels. The spectrum consists of 
channels that differ from each other due to various network parameters such as noise, bandwidth 
or even availability. These differences make the spectrum heterogeneous in nature with channels 
considered to have some `quality' parameter determined by the payoff that a CRN may achieve if 
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it is able to gain access to that channel. The notations and acronyms commonly used in this 
chapter are shown in table 6.1. 
Table 6.1: Notations and acronyms – Chapter 6 
Notation Definition 
   CRN’s action of selecting channel   
   CRN’s utility for gaining access to channel   
  set of contending CRNs 
  set of available channels 
 ̂ prob. distribution over set of channels (in MSNE) 
      Expected Utility from accessing channel   
  joint prob. distribution of available channels (in CE) 
  current time 
  
 (   
 ) utility if all    in time slot   were replaced by    
   
  
 (   
     ) 
average difference in a CRN’s utility up to time   for not selecting every other  
channel    
  
   
 (   
     ) 
CRN’s average regret up to time   for selecting channel    instead of every other 
other channel    
  that was not selected  
  
    probability of selecting a channel for next time slot 
  Set of strategies in equilibrium 
 ( ) utility function for all actions in equilibrium 
    Price of Anarchy 
PU Primary User 
SU Secondary User 
NE Nash Equilibrium 
PSNE Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium 
MSNE Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium 





Following are the underlying assumptions for the work presented in this chapter: 
 Time: A single MAC superframe constitutes one time slot. Every CRN needs to gain 
access to a channel for which it contends with all other collocated CRNs in every 
time slot. One superframe's time slot is also treated as one iteration in the spectrum 
sharing game. 
 Spectrum opportunity and wastage: A given time slot's spectrum opportunity arises 
due to a PU being idle in its allocated channel. The opportunity may result in a 
collision and be wasted if two or more CRNs select the same channel for accessing in 
the same time slot. 
 Knowledge about PU activity: In addition to the FCC mandated continuous spectrum 
sensing to detect PUs' activity, CRNs are also required to periodically access online 
databases such as [15][16] in order to gain up-to-date information about licensed PUs 
operating in a given region. 
 Channel quality: The amount of PU activity, bandwidth and SNR which collectively 
determine a channel's quality can be learnt from online databases and measured 
through spectrum sensing over a period of time. Due to the fact that all contending 
CRNs are collocated in a given region, it is reasonable to assume that a given 
channel's quality is common knowledge. 
 History of channel access: As stated above, all CRNs are collocated in a given 
region and are contending for the same spectrum resource. Therefore, every CRN can 
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tell which channels other CRNs were able to gain access to in previous time slots and 
determine channel access history. 
 Non-cooperative behavior: All CRNs are independent as they do not share a common 
goal and therefore do not cooperate with each other. Being rational about their 
choices, every player has a clear preference of selecting the best available channel 
before the start of every time slot. Consequently, if every player tries to access the 
best channel, it will result in a collision and the spectrum opportunity being wasted. 
 Payoffs4: Players5 that eventually gain access to higher quality channels will gain 
higher payoffs as compared to the players that end up with lower quality channels. In 
the subsequent section, we show that our proposed spectrum sharing game can be 
implemented solely on the basis of a CRN's own payoff observations. 
6.4 Equilibrium Solutions for Heterogeneous Spectrum Sharing Game 
In this section, we first present the formulation of our proposed spectrum sharing game, 
followed by the derivation of pure and mixed strategy NE. Next we introduce the concept of CE 
and demonstrate how it can be achieved in a centralized implementation for a 2-player game 
using linear optimization. We also demonstrate that CE can be achieved in a distributed manner 
for an  -player game using a learning algorithm called channel selection learning algorithm 
which is an adaptation of the No-Regret (NR) learning algorithm [17]. Using these concepts we 
model the problem of self-coexistence and heterogeneous spectrum sharing in the following 
                                                 
4
 We use the terms utility and payoff interchangeably. 
5
 Similarly, we use the terms CRNs and players interchangeably. 
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subsections as an anti-coordination game framework. The game is a non-cooperative repeated 
game with perfect information because: 
 Being rational players, CRNs compete for the best channels available in the spectrum 
band and are interested only in maximizing their own utility. Therefore, CRNs are not 
bound to cooperate with each other.  
 Utilities are common knowledge since the quality of various network parameters can 
be measured by every CRN. Also, every CRN can tell which channels other CRNs 
were able to gain access to in the past hence they know other CRNs' payoffs. 
6.4.1 Game Formulation 
The heterogeneous spectrum sharing anti-coordination game presented in this chapter is 
represented as    ⟨( )  ( ) ( )⟩. Players in the game   are CRNs represented by  . Every 
player in the game has the same action space represented by               and the set of 
utilities of the channels is              . Let            denote the set of available 
channels and there is a bijection between the sets   and . Also, Let   and   represent the total 
number of collocated CRNs and the total number of available channels, respectively. Strategy    
means selecting channel   for communication and a player gets a payoff of    if he selected 
channel  and no other player selected the same channel for a given time slot. The payoff for 
players playing strategies    and    when competing against each other is denoted by the ordered 
pair   (     )    and is a function of an individual channel's quality given by: 
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 (     )  {
(     )                       
(   )                               
 (1) 
where the first element of the ordered pair  (     ) represents the payoff for player that selected 
channel   and the second element for player that selected channel  . For the sake of clarity and 
ease in analysis and without any loss of generality, we assume that               
 . Initially, 
we consider a game with 2 players and 2 heterogeneous channels. Later, we present the case with 
 -players and  -channels in section 6.4.4. The game represented by equation 1 can also be 
represented in strategic form as table 6.2, which shows the payoffs for two players selecting 
channels   or  . Since       , it is in every CRN's interest to choose channel   instead of 
channel   for a larger payoff. However, when the players select the same channel it results in a 
collision, the spectrum opportunity being wasted and both player end up with a payoff of 0. On 
the other hand, if both players select different channels then their payoffs reflect the quality of 
the channel to which they are able to gain access. As shown in table 6.2, this game is the reverse 
of the classic Battle of the Sexes game and is classified as an anti-coordination game where it is 
in both players' interest not to end up selecting the same strategy. 
6.4.2 Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria 
In this subsection we derive the game’s solutions in the form of pure strategy Nash equilibria 
(PSNE) as well as the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) for our spectrum sharing anti-
coordination game. 
Definition 1: The Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium [18] of the spectrum sharing game is an 
action profile      of actions, such that: 
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 (   
      
 )   (        
 )              (2) 
where   is a preference relation over payoffs of strategies    
  and    . The above definition 
means that for    
  to be a pure strategy NE, it must satisfy the condition that no player   has 
another strategy that yields a higher payoff than the one for playing    
  given that every other 
player plays their equilibrium strategy     
 . 
 





Lemma 1: Strategy pairs (     ) and (     ) are pure strategy NE of the anti-coordination 
game. 
Proof: Assume player 1 to be the row player and player 2 to be the column player in table 
6.2. From equation 1 it follows that both    and    are positive values and therefore the payoffs 
for strategy pairs (     ) and (     ) are greater than the payoffs for strategy pairs (     )  and 
(     ). Consider the payoff for strategy pair (     ) from table 6.2. Given that the player 
playing strategy    continues to play this strategy, then from definition 1 for NE, it follows that 
the player playing strategy    does not have any incentive to change his choice to    i.e., it will 
       
   (0,0) (   ,   ) 
   (  ,   ) (0,0) 
144 
 
receive a smaller payoff of 0 if it switched to   . Therefore, (     ) is a PSNE. The same 
argument can be applied to prove that the strategy pair (     ) is the second PSNE of this game. ■ 
Definition 2: The Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium [18] of the spectrum sharing game is a 
probability distribution  ̂ over the set of actions    for any player such that: 
 ̂                  
         ∑   
 
      (3) 
which makes the opponents indifferent about the choice of their strategies by making the payoffs 
from all of their strategies equal. Let   be the probability with which player 1 plays strategy    
and   (   ) be the probability of playing strategy   , then from the payoffs of table 6.2, the 
expected utility of player 2 for playing strategy    is given by: 
   (  )     (     )    (     )   ( )   (  ) (4) 
Similarly, the expected utility of player 2 for playing strategy    is given by: 
   (  )     (     )    (     )   (  )   ( ) (5) 
According to definition 2, player 2 will be indifferent about the choice of strategies when the 
expected utilities from playing strategies    and    are equal, i.e., 
   (  )     (  ) (6) 
Substituting equations 4 and 5 in equation 6, we have  
        . Therefore: 
  
  
     
 (7) 
       
  




The mixed strategy NE for the heterogeneous spectrum sharing game is given by the 
distribution  ̂        of equations 7 and 8 which means that when both players select strategies 
   and    with probabilities   and   respectively, then their opponents will be indifferent about 
the outcomes of the play. To generalize, expected utility for every player in a  -channel 
heterogeneous spectrum sharing game is given as follows: 
    ∑     
 
         (9) 
where    represents the probability of a CRN selecting channel   and all other CRNs not 
selecting channel  . We will utilize equation 9 in section 6.5 for the fairness and efficiency 
analysis of the various game equilibria. 
6.4.3 Centralized Correlated Equilibrium for 2-Player Game 
Under pure and mixed strategy NE, it is assumed that the players choose their strategies 
independently and without any prior coordination. However as we demonstrate next, it is in 
every player's interest to coordinate their actions such that the outcomes are favorable to all 
players by avoiding. Players would maximize their utilities if somehow they could avoid ending 
up selecting the same channels. A coordination or the lack thereof, in selecting channels would 
essentially make it an anti-coordination game. Such a coordination to avoid selecting same 
channels can be achieved with the help of a mutually trusted central entity that can provide all 
players with a recommendation signal. The external recommendation signals can either be public 
or private signals or they can even be learnt over a period of time eliminating the need for a 
central entity making possible its distributed implementation. In this subsection, we present the 
centralized algorithm to achieve the centralized correlated equilibrium (CE) for a 2-player, 2-
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channel game while the distributed algorithm to achieve CE with a channel selection learning 
algorithm for an  -player  -channel game is presented in the next subsection. 
 





CE is a state in which, when given the availability of an external recommendation signal, 
none of the players can achieve a greater utility by ignoring that signal when all other players 
follow the recommended action. In other words,   is a correlated equilibrium if no strategy 
modification can result in an increase in a player's expected utility. Formally, CE is defined as: 
Definition 3: A probability distribution   is a Correlated Equilibrium of a game when [19]: 
∑  (      )           (      )    (  
     )         (10) 
 (      ) is the joint probability distribution of players to select a certain strategy pair in the 
next time slot. The inequality (10) represents that selecting some different strategy   
   instead of 
   in the next time slot will not result in a higher payoff for a player given that all other players 
adhere to the recommended strategy. In a centralized implementation of correlated equilibrium 
for a 2-player 2-strategy game such as the one shown in table 6.3, any external entity e.g., one of 
 a1 a2 
a1           
a2           
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the contending CRNs may be selected as the recommender that calculates and provides the 
external recommendation signal for all contending CRNs according to the CE joint probability 
distribution   (                   ). The strategic form of such a correlated strategy pair is 
shown in table 6.3. A correlated strategy pair means that the action pair (     ) is played with 
probability      and action pair (     ) is played with probability      etc. 
Here we derive the centralized CE of the heterogeneous spectrum sharing game using a linear 
optimization approach. CE can be implemented for a multi-player game using linear 
optimization; however, with this method the number of constraints for CE grows exponentially 
with the number of players and their strategies and the problem grows at a polynomial rate [20]. 
Therefore, we derive centralized correlated equilibrium only for a 2-player game and consider 
the case for an  -player game in the next subsection when we present the case for a 
decentralized CE. Let the objective function   to find the optimal strategy CE for a 2-player 
game be defined as: 
       
    
∑ ∑ [  (     )     (     )]
 
   
 
         (11) 
where the constraints for CE in equation (11) are: 
                      (12) 
       (     )    (     )         (     )    (     )  (13) 
       (     )    (     )         (     )    (     )  (14) 
       (     )    (     )         (     )    (     )  (15) 
       (     )    (     )         (     )    (     )  (16) 
                           (17) 
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For the game of tables 6.2 and 6.3, any correlated equilibrium of the form   (        
 ) will maximize the sum of expected payoffs for the players because it eliminates the possibility 
of the players contending for the same channel. For an egalitarian equilibrium which is fair and 
maximizes the sum of expected payoffs, we have an additional constraint defined as equation 
(17). 
Having the recommender to provide external signal based on equation (11) and the 
constraints (12) to (17), ensures that probability of the two players ending up in the same channel 
is minimized so that the likelihood of spectrum opportunity wastage is also minimized and hence 
players' utilities can be maximized. It must be noted that the external recommendation signal is 
not binding and players are free to ignore recommended actions. The efficiency of avoiding the 
collision condition is achieved only because the players know that they will achieve higher 
payoffs by following the recommendation signal. This argument is explained with the help of 
following example. 
Consider a situation in which the recommender selects an egalitarian CE probability 
distribution   (           ) over the payoff matrix of table 6.3 in order for the two 
players to avoid selecting the strategy pairs (     ) and (     ). Suppose the external signal 
randomly recommends player 1 to select action    i.e., channel 2 which is of lower quality and 
results in a smaller payoff of 7 compared with a payoff of 9 if channel 1 was selected for next 
time slot. Player 1 knows that player 2 will follow the recommended action because it has been 
recommended a higher quality channel. It is however in player 1's interest to select the action 
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recommended by the external signal since it would yield a higher payoff of 7 instead of 0 if 
external signal is ignored and both players end up selecting the same higher quality channel. 
6.4.4 Distributed Correlated Equilibrium for N-Player Game 
CE for a 2-player game was derived in the previous subsection and in this subsection we 
consider the case for an  -player  -channel game and demonstrate how CE can be achieved in a 
distributed manner and without the need of any communication among the CRNs or an external 
recommendation signal. To this end, we propose a novel channel selection learning algorithm 
which is an adaptation of the No-Regret learning algorithm [17] to achieve CE. Channel 
selection learning algorithm is based on the concept of minimizing a CRN's regret in the 
hindsight for not selecting a particular channel in every time slot up to the current time  . Next 
we detail the working of the channel selection learning algorithm. 
Channel Selection Learning Algorithm: Suppose that the heterogeneous spectrum sharing 
game   is played repeatedly at every time slot           and every CRN knows the history of 
plays    of every other CRN up to time   because of being collocated. Given a history of play 
   (  
 )    
  up to time  , every CRN calculates a probability   
     (  ) of selecting the 
same channel   
  for the next time slot. The probability for selecting a channel for the next time 
slot is calculated as follows: for every two different channel choices        and    
     up to 
time  , if every CRN replaces channel      with channel    
  every time that it was selected in the 




 (   
 )  {
  
 (  
      
 )                 
     
  
 (  
 )                            
           (18) 
Then the average difference in a CRN’s payoff up to time   is given by: 
  
 (   
     )  
 
 
∑    
 (   
 )    
 (  
 )       (19) 
and every player’s average regret at time   is given by: 
   
 (   
     )     
 (   
     ) 
  (20) 
then the probabilities of selecting channels     and   
  in the next time slot are a function of a 
CRN's average regret and given by: 
  
   (   
  )  
 
 
   
 (   
     ) (21) 
  
   (  )      
   (   
  ) (22) 
The parameter   determines the amount of inertia that a CRN possesses in deviating from its 
current choice of a given channel and its value is constrained by       (   ), such that   is 
the number of channels available for contention and   is the upper bound on    ( ) . Its value is 
independent of time as well as the play's history and also ensures that there is always a positive 
probability of staying in the same channel as in the previous time slot. As    , the empirical 
probability distribution   over the  -tuples of strategies converges to the CE [20]. A summary of 






Table 6.4: Channel Selection Learning Algorithm 
Data:     (upper bound on    ( ) .) 
Result: Every channel’s prob. of being selected by every CRN for the next time slot. 
Initialization:   
 (  )   
 
  
        ,     
while CRNs contend for heterogeneous channels do 
1.   for every CRN do 
2.           Compute current Regret    
  up to time   for not selecting channel    
    as 
per equation (20); 
3.           Calculate   
    i.e., prob. of selecting channel    and all other channels    
  for 
the next time slot as per equations (21) and (22); 
4.                  
5.    end for 
end while 
 
6.5 Fairness and Efficiency of Derived Equilibria 
Having demonstrated how CE can be achieved for an  -player (     )-channel game, we 
now provide an analysis on the fairness and efficiency of all of the equilibria derived. For the 
sake of clarity and easy analysis we consider the case of a 2-player 2-channel heterogeneous 
spectrum sharing game while the same arguments can be applied for analyzing an  -player  -
channel scenario. There are three different types of equilibria computed in preceding subsections 
for the spectrum sharing heterogeneous game: 
 Two pure-strategy NE for the anti-coordination game (     ) and (     ). 
 A mixed strategy NE defined by the probability distribution  ̂        given by 
equations (7) and (8). 
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 A Correlated Equilibrium defined by the probability distribution   (        
 ) over joint strategy pairs of table 6.3 given by equation (11) and constrained by 
equations (12) to (17). 
Price of Anarchy: To analyze the efficiency of these equilibria, we first introduce Price of 
Anarchy (   ) [21], a measure of degradation due to selfish behavior of non-cooperating 
players in a system. Let     be a set of strategies in equilibrium such that       and    refer 
to the sets of strategies in pure strategy NE, mixed strategy NE, and CE for the heterogeneous 
spectrum sharing game, respectively. We define the measure of efficiency of the game as a 
utility function       such that 
 ( )  ∑   ( )
   
    (23) 
then     is defined as the ratio between optimal efficiency and the worst equilibrium efficiency 
of the game, as follows: 
    
          ( )
          ( )
 (24) 
where the strategies     represent progressively higher efficiency as     approaches 1. 
Optimal Efficiency: The heterogeneous spectrum sharing game will result in optimum 
efficiency when all of the contending CRNs always select different channels i.e., they are able to 
avoid contention for the same channel which would result in a collision and zero payoff. In the 
presence of selfish players, such optimality is only possible with a correlated choice of strategies 
as well as fair distribution of spectrum resource. When these conditions are satisfied then the 
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maximum value of the utility function  ( ) is given as the sum of utilities of all channels as 
follows: 
          ( )  ∑        (25) 
Next we discuss the fairness of equilibria as well as their efficiency by deriving the worst 
equilibrium efficiencies and comparing them with optimal efficiency of the game as per equation 
(25). 
PoA with Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria: As assumed previously in section 6.3.1, channel   
is of higher quality than channel   therefore      . Then from the payoff matrix of table I, 
gaining access to channel   brings a larger payoff to a CRN whereas being of comparatively 
lower quality, channel   brings a smaller payoff. There are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria 
(     ) and (     ), however both of them are unfair because       and one player always 
gets a smaller payoff than the other. Since the game is a non-cooperative game and every player 
is interested in maximizing its own payoff, all of them will end up selecting the larger payoff 
channels resulting in contention and collision in every time slot and hence zero payoffs. As a 
result PoA is not defined in the context of PSNE of this game and therefore, PSNE is not a 
practical solution for this game. 
PoA with Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium: MSNE of our spectrum sharing game is the 
probability distribution  ̂        given by equations (7) and (8). Since the expected utilities 
    given by equation (9) for all players are equal when they mix their strategies according to 
the distribution  ̂, we can conclude that MSNE is fair. 
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We now derive     for the game to be able to determine its efficiency under MSNE. There 
is only one MSNE of the game therefore, minimum value of the utility function  ( ) under 
MSNE is the sum of expected utilities of every player from equation (9) and is given by: 
           ( )        ∑        
   
       (26) 
and the price of anarchy under MSNE is given by 
     
∑   
   
   
   ∑     
   
      
 (27) 
by substituting equation (23) and (26) in (24). 
PoA with Correlated Equilibrium: The correlated equilibrium (CE) of a 2-player 2-channel 
spectrum sharing game is defined by the probability distribution of tuple   (         ) 
over joint strategy pairs constrained by equation (18). Equations (18) to (22) represent the 
channel selection learning algorithm implemented to achieve CE for an  -player  -channel 
scenario. Correlation in the choice of strategies ensures that the probability of players selecting 
the same channel for contention is minimized so that the spectrum opportunity is not wasted due 
to collision and players' payoffs are maximized. As demonstrated in next section, the NR 
algorithm takes some time to converge to CE during which they may select the same channels 
resulting in collisions. However after convergence, the contending CRNs never select the same 
channel thus wastage of spectrum opportunities is avoided altogether and all channels are 
utilized to the maximum. Therefore, minimum value of the utility function  ( )  under CE is the 
sum of expected utilities of every player given as: 
           ( )  ∑   
   
    (28) 
155 
 
and     under CE is given as: 
     
∑   
   
   
∑   
   
   
   (29) 
Discussion: Under the constraint for the MSNE probabilities of selecting different channels 
       and ∑   
   
     , minimum value of the utility function  ( ) in equation (26) will 
always be smaller than 1. This means that     under MSNE of equation (27) will always be 
greater than 1. On the other hand CE has a price of anarchy equal to 1 which according to its 
definition is the most efficient case. This is a clear evidence of CE not only being fair but also 




6.6 Simulations and Results 
6.6.1 Simulation Setup 
For the purpose of validating the effectiveness of CE, we implemented our proposed anti-
coordination game along with the channel selection learning algorithm. We verify that CE is 
achievable, fair and efficient as it always yields a higher expected utility per CRN as compared 
with MSNE. For the purpose of simulation,   represents the number of CRNs and   represents 
the number of channels in the spectrum available for secondary access by the CRNs. We first 
carry out the comparison of CE and MSNE with a 2-player 2-channel game i.e.,     and 
    and calculate expected utilities per CRN.  
We have also carried out simulations with varying number of CRNs and channels and 
demonstrate that the game always converges to CE. Since the channel selection learning 
algorithm approaches CE based solely on a given network's own payoff observations in 
combination with the common knowledge of the entire CRN population, it allows the distributed 
implementation of our proposed anti-coordination game. Inertia parameter of the channel 
selection learning algorithm is   whose value is kept constant for all simulations except for the 
simulation of figure 6.3 in which we demonstrate the effect of changing the values of  . In rest of 
the simulations, it can be observed that the convergence rate to equilibrium decreases as the 




Figure 6.2: Expected utilities per CRN for              and utilities from the two channels 
are:      $ and      with varying inertia parameter $\mu$. (a)     , (b)      , (c) 
      and (d)      . Different values of   achieve the same convergence value of expected 
utility however as inertia increases, it causes a decrease in convergence rate. 
 
6.6.2 Simulation Results 
Figure 6.2 shows a comparison of expected utilities per CRN under MSNE and CE with 
various values for the inertia parameter  . Payoff value for channel 1 is      while channel 2 
has a payoff of     . Compared with all the four plots for CE in figure 6.3 where the expected 
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utilities converge to 8 per CRN, MSNE yields a smaller expected utility of 3.93 per CRN, 
proving our analysis that CE is more efficient than MSNE. Different values of   achieve CE at 
different rates however the convergence values are identical. As evident from figure 6.2,   being 
the inertia parameter, reflects a CRN's propensity towards staying in the same channel in next 
time as the previous one.  
Figure 6.3: Comparison of CE at different values of the number of networks ( ) and channels 
( ). Y-axes represent expected utility per CRN. For this simulation     where (a)      , 
(b)       and (c)       such that                        . 
 
Figure 6.3 shows a comparison of CE at different values of the number of networks ( ) and 
channels ( ). For this simulation, the number of CRNs is kept the same as the number of 
channels available for contention i.e.,     such that utilities of the channels are     , 
      and     . With every additional CRN, a lower quality channel was added to the 




Figure 6.4: Comparison of CE when     and number of networks is kept fixed. Y-axes 
represent expected utility per CRN. (a)      , (b)        , (c)        . CRNs 
always select the best out of the available pool of channels therefore the convergence value of 
expected utilities are equal however convergence rate increase as    . 
 
Figure 6.4 shows the CE for expected utilities per CRN over time such that     i.e., 
increasing the number of available channels from 4 to 6 while keeping the number of contending 
CRNs constant at 4. Notice that the convergence value for expected utility is the same for all 
cases. It shows a very important aspect of the channel selection learning algorithm which allows 
CRNs to always have a fair as well as an efficient distribution of channel resources as players 
choose the highest quality channels from the pool of available channels. Also, the speed of 
convergence to CE is fastest when the number of CRNs is equal to the number of available 
channels i.e.,    . Payoff values for channels 1 through 6 for this simulation are kept at 9, 7, 6, 
5, 4 and 3 respectively.  
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Figures 6.5 (a), (b) and (c) show the CE for expected utilities per CRN over time such that 
     i.e., decreasing the number of CRNs from 4 to 2 while keeping the number of available 
channels constant at 4. Intuitively, expected utility per CRN is lowest at      and      as 
compared with the situation when the number of contending networks is smaller however, the 
speed of convergence to CE is fastest when    . Payoff values for channels 1 through 4 are 9, 
7, 6 and 5 respectively.  
Figure 6.5: (a), (b) and (c)     and number of networks is kept fixed. Y-axes represent 
expected utility per CRN. (a)      , (b)        , (c)        . Decrease in 
number of networks results in an increase in expected utilities and convergence rate decreases as 
the number of channels increases. (d), (e) and (f)     and number of channels is kept fixed. Y-
axes represent expected utility per CRN. (a)      , (b)        , (c)        . 
Increase in number of networks results in a corresponding decrease in expected utility per CRN 
however the convergence rate decreases as the number of channels increases. 
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Finally, figures 6.5 (d), (e) and (f) show the results of simulation when      and the 
number of channels is kept fixed while the number of contending CRNs is increased. It shows 
that as soon as the number of CRNs contending for channels becomes more than the number of 
channels available, there will always be at least one collision between two or more CRNs in 
every time slot making the expected utility per CRN to drop significantly. However, the channel 
selection learning algorithm still manages to achieve CE despite much degraded expected 
utilities per CRN. 
Figure 6.6: Channel access pattern of CRNs. (a) Selfish behavior from CRNs for best quality 
channel (channel 1) will always result in a collision. (b) Fair distribution of spectrum resource 
when CRNs mix their choice of channels according to MSNE. However, MSNE is inefficient 





Figure 6.6 illustrates the non-cooperative behavior from CRNs for self coexistence and the 
improvement that can be achieved with our proposed channel selection learning algorithm. 
Figure 6.6(a) shows how selfish behavior may result in collision and wastage of spectrum 
resource. figure 6.6(b) depicts a scenario where MSNE results in a fair yet inefficient spectrum 
utilization while figure 6.6(c) shows performance improvement achieved through CE. 
6.7 Conclusions 
Coexistence protocols employed by collocated CRNs usually do not take into consideration 
the fact that spectrum bands vary significantly with regards to channel quality thereby making 
some channels of the spectrum bands more attractive to CRNs than others. We aimed at solving 
the problem of sharing heterogeneous spectrum by adopting a game theoretic approach. By 
analyzing the system's efficiency and fairness with the help of price of anarchy, we demonstrated 
that correlated equilibrium solves the problem of inefficiency and unfairness associated with the 
game solutions of pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria. Furthermore, to address the problems 
associated with a centralized implementation, we proposed the use of a novel channel selection 
learning algorithm that enables the CRNs to achieve correlated equilibrium in a distributed 
manner.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
CRNs are a perfect solution to the problems of having a wide gap between the demand and 
supply of wireless spectrum resource coupled with the fact that fixed spectrum allocation has 
caused its severe under-utilization. The gap is bridged by CRNs by utilizing DSA to enable 
secondary, unlicensed access to spectrum bands otherwise licensed to PUs, in an opportunistic 
and non-interfering basis. This communication paradigm however comes with its own set of 
challenges and this dissertation has addressed some of them. Specifically, we have provided a 
wide range of solutions to handle degradation in TCP’s throughput resulting from opportunistic 
spectrum access, SSDF as well as jamming attacks and sharing of heterogeneous spectrum 
resources among collocated CRNs to induce cooperation among otherwise non-cooperative 
CRNs. 
The contributions of this dissertation are as follows: 
 Design of two cross-layer mechanisms to boost TCP’s throughput that may be 
degraded because of network-wide quiet periods enforced for spectrum sensing, 
opportunistic and dynamic spectrum access, and non-deterministic operation of PUs. 
 Design of a novel framework for collaborative spectrum sensing for ad hoc cognitive 
radio networks under byzantine SSDF attacks. The framework incorporates a spatio-
spectral anomaly detection system that functions in conjunction with a reputation 
system to detect malicious nodes in the CRN. 
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 Designed a novel adaptive defense framework called DS3 which enables the IEEE 
802.22 based CRNs to thwart smart jamming attacks as well as improve spectrum 
utilization by SUs under noisy channel conditions. 
 Designed an evolutionary game theoretic approach to enable collocated and 
independent CRNs to evolve a strategy that would ensure long term coexistence with 
fair distribution of heterogeneous spectrum resources in a distributed manner. 
 Designed another game theoretic approach based on the concept of Correlated 
Equilibrium which ensures that the distribution of heterogeneous spectrum resources 
is not only fair but also optimal in the long term. To that end, both centralized as well 
as distributed solutions are presented utilizing linear optimization and machine 
learning techniques. 
 
